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Competition law proceedings before the European Commission and the right 
to a fair trial: no need for reform? 
 
 
Donald Slater, Sébastien Thomas and Denis Waelbroeck*
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
In light of the EC Commission's recent public consultation on the functioning of Regulation 
1/2003,1
First, as so often stressed –and most recently by the OECD–, "combining the function of 
investigation and decision in a single institution" may have the effect to "dampen internal 
critique" within the institution and raise "concerns about the absence of checks and 
balances".
 it appears to us an opportune moment to look again at the Commission's 
enforcement powers and potential need for reform in this regard. This paper considers the 
current accumulation of investigational, prosecutorial and adjudicative powers within the 
Commission in competition matters and the negative impact of that accumulation on the 
quality of decision-making and the problems it raises with respect to the right to a fair trial.  
 
2
Second, from a strictly legal point of view, the combination of all powers within one institution 
raises the question of the compatibility of competition law proceedings led by the European 
Commission ("the Commission") with the fundamental right to a fair trial as enshrined in 
Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR").
 Creating the proper decisional structure is indeed fundamental for the quality of 
decisions.  
 
3
Traditionally, the view is taken that, it is sufficient for Commission decisions in antitrust cases 
to be subject to review by the Community courts and particularly by the Court of First Instance 
("the CFI"), even if the Commission itself is not an "independent and impartial tribunal" under 
Article 6 ECHR.
  
 
4
A thorough analysis of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights ("the ECtHR") 
shows that fundamental procedural rights are broader and apply much more strictly when 
 
 
However, where fines of close to a billion € are imposed today on companies and where 
competition law is becoming more and more criminalised, it is questionable whether this view 
is still valid. 
 
                                                        
* Associate at Ashurst (Brussels); Teaching Assistant at the College of Europe (Bruges); and Partner at 
Ashurst (Brussels) and Professor at the ULB and at the College of Europe (Bruges) respectively. 
1  See IP/08/12030. 
2 See OECD country studies –European Commission– Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy – 
2005, p. 62. 
3 See notably D. WAELBROECK and D. FOSSELARD, “Should the Decision-Making Power in EC Antitrust 
Procedures be left to an Independent Judge? – The Impact of the European Convention of Human 
Rights on EC Antitrust Procedures”, 15 YEL (1995), pp. 111-142; W. WILS, “The Combination of the 
Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis”, 27(2) World Competition (2004), pp. 201-224; K. LENAERTS and J. 
VANHAMME, “Procedural Rights of Private Parties in the Community Administrative Process”, 34 CMLR 
(1997), pp. 531-569; W. WILS, “La compatibilité des procédures communautaires en matière de 
concurrence avec la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme”, CDE (1996), pp. 329-354. D. 
WAELBROECK and C. SMITS, "Le droit de la concurrence et les droits fondamentaux", in "Les droits de 
l'homme dans les politiques de l'Union européenne", Larcier, 2006, p. 135 et seq.; D. WAELBROECK, 
"Twelve feet all dangling down and six necks exceeding long. The EU network of competition authorities 
and the European Convention on Fundamental Rights", in "The EU Network of Competition Authorities", 
Hart Publishing 2005, p. 465 et seq. 
4 See e.g. judgment of the CFI of 11 July 2007 in case T-351/03, Schneider Electric 3A v. Commission 
at para 183. 
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"criminal sanctions" are imposed, in contrast with cases in which civil remedies or 
administrative sanctions are provided.  
 
True, the EU is currently not a party to the ECHR. This does however not mean that –as 
sometimes stated in the past– the ECJ "does not have systematically to take into account, as 
regards fundamental rights under Community law, the interpretation of the Convention given 
by the Strasbourg authorities”.5 First, the European Court of Justice ("the ECJ") has always 
indicated its willingness to follow the case-law of the ECtHR.6 Second, it follows from recent 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence that the provision of the ECHR must also be respected in the EU.7
As will be shown hereafter, unless the Community competition procedure is changed, it might 
sooner or later lead to a formal condemnation of all the Member States collectively
   
 
8 or of the 
EU itself9 by the ECtHR.  
 
This paper will thus show that, given the rapid "criminalisation" of competition law 
proceedings, sanctions should in principle be imposed at first instance
I. Sanctions imposed by the Commission in competition proceedings are "criminal 
charges" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR 
 by an independent and 
impartial tribunal fulfilling all the conditions of Article 6 ECHR (part I). Or at the very least, 
these sanctions should be subject to full jurisdictional review by an independent and impartial 
tribunal in order to comply with Article 6 ECHR and to cure the defects of the administrative 
procedure (part II). It is doubtful however whether such a full jurisdictional review, as it is 
understood by the ECtHR, is available at Community-level in antitrust cases. 
 
 
 
A. The notion of "criminal charge" under Article 6 ECHR 
According to Article 6 ECHR,10
                                                        
5 Joined Opinion of Mr Advocate General Darmon delivered on 18 May 1989 in case 374/87, Orkem v. 
Commission and in case 27/88, Solvay v. Commission, [1989] ECR p. 3283. 
6 A formal commitment to abide by fundamental rights as enshrined in the ECHR was even undertaken 
in Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union. The ECJ tends indeed increasingly to refer directly to 
judgments of the ECtHR in its own rulings. See for example the judgment of the CFI of 8 July 2008 in 
case T-99/04, AC-Treuhand AG v. Commission, not yet reported, at para. 52; judgment of the Court of 1 
July 2008 in Joined cases C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P, Chronopost SA and La Poste v. Union française 
de l’express (UFEX) and Others, not yet reported, at para. 46. For a critical comment on this, see 
notably A.G. TOTH, “The European Union and Human Rights: the Way Forward”, 34 CMLR (1997), pp. 
491 et seq. 
7 See the judgments of the ECtHR of 18 February 1999, Matthews v. United Kingdom, App. n° 
24833/94, and of 30 June 2005, Bosphorus v. Ireland, App. n° 45036/98. The latter judgment indicates 
at para. 156 that any presumption of compliance with the provisions of the ECHR by the EU "can be 
rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention 
rights was manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of international co-operation would be 
outweighed by the Convention’s role as a “constitutional instrument of European public order” in the field 
of human rights." 
8 Such attempts have already been made in the past (see notably the Senator Lines case, App. 
n°56672/00) where the compatibility of the non-suspensory nature of Community proceedings with 
Article 6 ECHR was questioned. The application was finally declared as "devoid of purpose" by the 
ECtHR after the CFI decided to set aside the fine imposed by the Commission. 
9 This would be possible in the perspective of accession to the ECHR by the European Union, which is 
explicitly made possible by the new Reform Treaty (see Article 6 of the future Treaty on the European 
Union, as approved by the Lisbon intergovernmental conference, which states that “The Union shall 
accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Such accession shall not affect the Union's competences as defined in the Treaties.”). 
10  Article 6 ECHR ("Right to a fair trial") reads as follows:  
 any "determination" of a civil right or obligation or of any 
criminal charge, has to be made by an "independent and impartial tribunal" fulfilling the 
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone 
is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press an public may be excluded 
from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of parties so require, or to the 
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requirements of Article 6(1) ECHR. In addition, criminal proceedings – by contrast with civil 
proceedings – also have to comply with additional guarantees spelled out in the second and 
third paragraphs of that provision. This distinction between civil and criminal proceedings has 
several implications in terms of procedural rights.11 In this respect, the ECtHR has always 
insisted on the specific nature of criminal proceedings as regards the rights of the defence12 
and on ensuring that Article 6 ECHR is not interpreted restrictively so that the rights 
guaranteed by this provision are not compromised.13
Considering the “prominent place held in a democratic society by the right to a fair trial”,
 
14 the 
ECtHR, “compelled to look behind the appearances and investigate the realities of the 
procedure in question”,15 has been prompted to give an autonomous meaning to the concept 
of "criminal charge" and "to prefer a ‘substantive’ rather than a ‘formal’ conception of the 
‘charge’ contemplated by Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1)".16 This is notably to avoid that the 
application of this provision could be circumvented by parties to the Convention, simply by 
their domestic classification of penalties.17
                                                                                                                                                              
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would 
prejudice the interests of justice. 
 
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to 
law. 
 
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
 
 a. to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature 
  and cause of the accusation against him; 
 
 b. to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
 
 c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not 
  sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice 
  so require; 
 
 d. to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
     examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; 
 
 e. to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language 
     of the court." 
Article 47 of the charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union similarly recognises that 
"Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal previously established by law". 
11 For a discussion of this distinction in the field of competition law, where merger control proceedings 
are generally considered as falling under the civil heading of Article 6 ECHR, whereas antitrust cases 
(i.e. implementing Article 81 and Article 82 EC with the possible use of sanctions by the Commission) 
are considered as falling under the criminal heading of  Article 6 ECHR, see notably D. WAELBROECK 
and D. FOSSELARD, cited above, W. WILS, cited above and A. ANDREANGELI, “Toward an EU Competition 
Court: “Article-6-Proofing” Antitrust Proceedings before the Commission ?”, World Competition 30 (4), 
pp. 595-622. 
12 See for example the Judgment of 9 March 2004, Pitkänen v. Finland, App. n° 30508/96, at para. 59. 
13 See for example the Judgement of 26 October 1984, De Cubber v. Belgium, Series A 86, at para. 32. 
14 Judgement of the ECtHR of 27 February 1980, Deweer v. Belgium, A 35, at para. 44. 
15 Ibidem 
16 Ibidem 
  
17 Judgement of the ECtHR of 8 June 1976, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, A 22, at para. 81. In 
this case, the ECtHR stated that “[t]he Convention without any doubt allows the States, in the 
performance of their function as guardians of the public interest, to maintain or establish a distinction 
between criminal law and disciplinary law, and to draw the dividing line, but only subject to certain 
conditions. The Convention leaves the States free to designate as a criminal offence an act or omission 
not constituting the normal exercise of one of the rights that it protects. This is made especially clear by 
Article 7 (…). Such a choice, which has the effect of rendering applicable Articles 6 and 7 (…), in 
principle escapes supervision by the Court. The converse choice, for its part, is subject to stricter rules. 
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In the landmark Özturk case,18 the ECtHR applied this reasoning to the situation in which 
road traffic offences had been classified as mere "regulatory offences" and not as "criminal 
offences" in Germany and where the German judge had therefore considered that the 
offender was not entitled to be offered a free interpreter during the so-called "administrative 
procedure". The ECtHR forcefully argued that "there is in fact nothing to suggest that the 
criminal offences referred to in the Convention necessarily imply a certain degree of 
seriousness" and that it would be "contrary to the object and purpose of Article 6 (…), which 
guarantees to “everyone charged with a criminal offence” the right to a court and to a fair trial, 
if the States were allowed to remove from the scope of this Article (…) a whole category of 
offences merely on the ground of regarding them as petty."19
• the classification of the offence under domestic law; 
 
 
In order to determine objectively whether proceedings involve the determination of a "criminal 
charge" in the sense of Article 6 ECHR, the ECtHR relies in particular on:  
 
• the nature of the offence; and 
• the nature and severity of the penalty (These three criteria are generally referred to 
as the "Engel criteria").20
 
 
These criteria are not cumulative and do not all carry the same weight.21 In particular, the 
classification under domestic law provides no more than a starting point but carries less 
weight than the other criteria which are more objective.22
• whether the norm is only addressed to a specific group or is of a generally binding 
character.
 
 
In later case-law, the ECtHR clarified and specified its second and third criteria used for the 
determination of a "criminal charge" as follows:  
 
23 (This criterion is mainly used to distinguish criminal sanctions from mere 
disciplinary sanctions, which are generally addressed only to a specific group or a 
specific profession);24
• whether the sanctions imposed are not merely compensatory but truly punitive and 
meant to have a deterrent effect;
 
25
• whether the level of the sanction and the stigma attaching to the offence is 
important.
 and  
26
                                                                                                                                                              
If the Contracting States were able at their discretion to classify an offence as disciplinary instead of 
criminal, or to prosecute the author of a "mixed" offence on the disciplinary rather than on the criminal 
plane, the operation of the fundamental clauses of Articles 6 and 7 (…) would be subordinated to their 
sovereign will. A latitude extending thus far might lead to results incompatible with the purpose and 
object of the Convention. The Court therefore has jurisdiction, under Article 6 (…) and even without 
reference to Articles 17 and 18 (…), to satisfy itself that the disciplinary does not improperly encroach 
upon the criminal.” See also for another example Société Stenuit v. France, Decision of the Commission 
of Human Rights of 27 February 1992, A/232-A. 
18 Judgement of the ECtHR of 21 February 1984, Öztürk v. Germany, A 73, at paras. 47-49. 
19 Öztürk v. Germany, cited above, at para. 53. 
20 See in particular the judgments of the ECtHR in Engel and others v. the Netherlands, cited above, at 
para. 82; in Öztürk v. Germany, cited above, at para. 50; and of 23 November 2006, Jussila v. Finland, 
App. n° 73053/01, at para. 30.  
21 See the Judgement of the ECtHR of 9 October 2003, Ezeh and Connors v. United Kingdom, App. n° 
39665/98 and 40086/98, at para. 86. 
22Öztürk v. Germany, cited above, at para. 52. 
23 See for example the Judgement of the ECtHR of 24 February 1994, Bendenoun v. France, A 284, at 
para. 46; and Jussila v. Finland, cited above, at para. 38.  
24 Judgement of 22 May 1990, Weber v. Switzerland, A 177, at para. 33. 
25 See the Judgement of the ECtHR of 7 July 1989, Tre Traktörer AB v. Sweden, A 159, at para. 46; and 
Bendenoun v. France, cited above, at para. 47: “the tax surcharges are intended not as a pecuniary 
compensation for damage but essentially as a punishment to deter reoffending”. 
 
26 In this regard, imprisonment is considered to be the criminal penalty par excellence. However, 
penalties other than deprivations of liberty have in the past also be considered severe enough to justify 
the applicability of Article 6. In the Malige case, for example (Judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports 
1998-VII), concerning a measure of docking points from driving licenses after a conviction for a traffic 
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Thus, wherever a sanction is imposed (whatever its qualification under domestic law) whose 
main objective is to "deter" from future violations of the norm it is meant to enforce, where the 
violation of that norm is generally perceived as inherently "bad" or contrary to the common 
values shared in a democratic society, and where the norm is generally addressed to an 
undefined group of persons, this sanction will inevitably be considered as a "criminal charge" 
under Article 6 ECHR. 
 
Where not all these factors lead towards the same conclusion, a balancing process will have 
to be carried out in order to assess the possible criminal nature of the sanction imposed. It 
appears from the case-law of the ECtHR that the deterrent function of the sanction and its 
severity will have a particular weight in this regard.27
B. Proceedings under EC competition law constitute "criminal charges" within 
the meaning of Article 6 ECHR
 
 
28
  
1. Application of the Engel criteria to EC competition proceedings 
 
(i) 
 
Domestic classification 
 
Much uncertainty as to whether EC competition law proceedings could be considered as 
involving a "criminal charge" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR has stemmed from the fact 
that the EC law's domestic classification of sanctions imposed by the Commission for 
breaches of Articles 81 and 82 EC is explicitly non-criminal. Thus, the text of Article 23(5) of 
Regulation 1/2003 (and its predecessor Article 15 of Regulation 17/62) provides that the 
decision by which the Commission imposes a fine on undertakings "shall not be of a criminal 
nature". 
 
However, it should be stressed that such classification is of little relevance in the present 
context for a number of reasons:  
 
Firstly, to the extent Article 23(5) of Regulation 1/2003 seeks to classify EC competition law 
proceedings for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR, it should be recalled that domestic 
classification is not the conclusive or the most important criterion in determining the criminal 
nature of proceedings under that provision. It is indeed merely a starting point, and the ECtHR 
has not in the past hesitated to go against this domestic classification.29
                                                                                                                                                              
offence, and where no possible detention as an alternative was involved, the Court found the measure 
to be of a severity to make it a criminal sanction (see P. VAN DIJK, F. VAN HOOF, A. VAN RIJN and L. 
ZWAAK, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th ed.), Intersentia, 
Antwerpen/Oxford, 2006, pp.548-554). In the Weber case (cited above), which concerned proceedings 
where the fine could amount to 500 Swiss francs and could be converted into a term of imprisonment in 
certain circumstances, the Court held that "what was at stake was sufficiently important to warrant 
classifying the offence as a criminal one under the Convention." In the Schmautzer case (Judgement of 
23 October 1995, A 328-A), the Court held that driving without wearing a seat-belt, an administrative 
offence under Austrian law, was criminal in nature, due notably to the fact that the fine of 200 Austrian 
schillings had been accompanied by an order for committal to prison in case of non-payment. 
27 See notably Bendenoun v. France, cited above, at para. 47; and Jussila v. Finland, cited above.  
28This section deals with the application of the Engel criteria to EC competition law. In other words, it 
deals with the criminal nature of EC competition law as appreciated in light of the ECHR. It is noted that 
this is obviously a different question from whether the Commission is a "tribunal" within the meaning of 
Article 6 ECHR. As consistently found by the ECJ, and as the Commission's itself agrees, it is not. See 
e.g. Judgment of the CFI of 15 March 2000 in joined cases T-25/95 and others, Cimenteries CBR and 
others [2000] ECR II-700, at paras. 712-724; and of 14 May 1998 in case T-348/94, Enso Española v. 
Commission [1998] ECR p. II-1875, at para. 56. See also Judgment of the Court of 29 October 1980 in 
joined cases 209 to 215 and 218/78, van Landewijck e.a. v. Commission (Fedetab) [1980] ECR p. 3125, 
at para. 81; and of 7 June 1983 in joined cases  100 to 103/80, Musique Diffusion française e.a. v. 
Commission [1983] ECR p. 1825, at para. 7. 
 This is in conformity 
with the aim "to prefer a ‘substantive’ rather than a ‘formal’ conception of the ‘charge’ 
29 See above, note 15. See also Engel & Others, supra note 17, at para 81; Öztürk, supra note 18, at 
para 49; Ezeh & Connors, supra note 21, at paras 83, 100; Judgment of the ECtHR of 16 December 
1997, Tejedor Garcia, App. n° 142/1996/761/962, ECR 1997-VIII, at para 27. 
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contemplated by Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1)."30 According to the case-law of the ECtHR, 
classifications under domestic law as to the criminal nature of the offence have only a 
"relative value".31
In this regard, when stating first in Article 15 of Regulation 17/62 and then in Article 23(5) of 
Regulation 1/2003 that fines "shall not be of a criminal nature", it is generally recognised that 
the main – or at least one key – reason was that Member States wanted to make it clear that 
in adopting Regulation 17/62 they were not recognising that the Community had any criminal 
competences.
 This is understandable, since the opposite conclusion would result in 
signatory states being able to unilaterally determine the scope of protection enjoyed by 
individuals under Article 6 ECHR. 
 
32
It is possible also that at the time of adoption of Regulation 17/62, Member States genuinely 
believed that the 
 
 
sanctions proposed – and perhaps even the proceedings more generally – 
were not truly of a criminal law nature. After all, for many years the fines imposed for even the 
most egregious breaches of Article 81 EC were sanctioned with fines running at most to tens 
of thousands of EUR, as opposed to thousands of times those amounts today, and the 
rhetoric surrounding enforcement was very different.33
When the provision was then taken over word for word in Regulation 1/2003 –and again no 
discussion at all appears in the initial proposal for Regulation 1/2003
  
 
34 in which the text 
already appeared– it is possible that there was a continued concern about a perceived 
transfer of competences in the criminal sphere. However, as noted above, this does not of 
course address the issue of substance in relation to Article 6 ECHR. 
 
One crucial point to note, however, is that – unlike the situation under Regulation 17/62 – in 
retaining the provision in Regulation 1/2003, it is certain
 "The issue of the compatibility of the Community’s competition procedure as a whole 
with Article 6 of the ECHR will be particularly important if, as seems probable, the 
fines which can be imposed by the Commission come to be regarded as criminal 
penalties for the purposes of Article 6."
 that at least some consideration was 
also given to Article 6 ECHR. This point was simply too important to be ignored given in 
particular the developments in the ECtHR case law over the previous decades, which clearly 
indicated that the fines in similar contexts were criminal in nature (see below (ii)). However, 
what the intention of Article 23(5) was in relation to this point remains a mystery. 
 
To our knowledge, the only institution to leave an official public trace of its consideration of 
the criminal nature of sanctions under Regulation 1/2003 is the European Parliament (which, 
it is recalled had only a consultative role in the legislative process). In its position document, 
the European Parliament did not request the removal of Article 23(5) of the Regulation, but 
called for proper judicial review of Commission (and national competition authority) decisions 
in the field of competition law, noting that: 
 
35
                                                        
30 Ibidem 
31 See the case-law of the ECtHR cited above. See accordingly W. WILS, "The Combination of the 
Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis", 27(2) World Competition (2004), p. 208; D. WAELBROECK and D. 
FOSSELARD, cited above, p. 120; and K. LENAERTS and J. VANHAMME, cited above, p. 557. 
32 See e.g. M. WAELBROECK and A. FRIGNANI, Commentaire Mégret, vol. 4, concurrence, Ed. ULB, 1997, 
p. 419 and references. See also R. Legros, "L'avenir du droit pénal international", Mélanges offerts à 
Henri Rolin, Paris, 1964, P. 194. 
33 These evolutions are considered in detail below. 
34 COM(2000)582, OJ [2000] C 385/284, 19 December 2000. 
35 European Parliament position, 1st reading or single reading, OJ [2002] C 72/236, 21 March 2002. See 
Amendment 43 proposed by the Parliament. In proposing this amendment the Parliament urged:  
 
" the institutions and the Member States to give careful consideration to amending Articles 229 and 230 
of the EC Treaty with a view to giving the Court of First Instance the power to conduct judicial review of 
findings and orders made by the Commission in its competition decisions to PE 296.005 64/65 
RR\296005EN.doc EN a standard sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 6 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; likewise calls on the 
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In conclusion on this point, it is unclear what the intention behind Article 23(5) of Regulation 
1/2003 was in relation to Article 6 ECHR. In any event, as indicated, domestic classification is 
not decisive for purposes of application of Article 6 ECHR. 
 
Secondly, although fines imposed by the Commission are explicitly classified as non-criminal, 
this does not necessarily imply that proceedings relating to EC competition law infringements 
are inherently non-criminal in nature. This is an important point, since Article 6 ECHR requires 
the respect of certain fundamental rights in the determination of "criminal charges" and 
"criminal offences" and does not talk in terms of criminal sanctions (which constitute only one 
of the Engel criteria). In determining this, the nature of the sanctions that are imposed is only 
one element (one of the Engel criteria).36 Another important consideration is the stigma 
attaching to the offences. Thus, whilst maintaining that sanctions imposed by it are not 
criminal, the Commission has pursued an active policy of heavily stigmatizing violations of EC 
competition law, and indeed the current Competition Commissioner has explicitly equated 
cartel activity to theft.37 
 
Thirdly and finally, Regulation 1/2003 explicitly foresees the formal criminalisation of such 
proceedings under national
                                                                                                                                                              
Commission to do whatever is necessary, in cooperation with the national authorities, to ensure that the 
application of Community competition law by national competition authorities is in all respects clearly in 
accordance with Article 6 of the European Convention".  
The following justification was given by the Parliament for this: 
"The issue of the compatibility of the Community’s competition procedure as a whole with Article 6 of the 
ECHR will be particularly important if, as seems probable, the fines which can be imposed by the 
Commission come to be regarded as criminal penalties for the purposes of Article 6. But even if this 
does not come about, it is already clear that Commission competition decisions determine the ‘civil 
rights and obligations’ of companies in very important ways. Therefore companies are entitled under 
Article 6 to ‘a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law’ in Community competition cases. The European Commission could not be regarded 
as a ‘tribunal’, and its procedures are not in public. In addition, it is open to question whether it could be 
considered ‘independent’ for this purpose, because essentially the same individuals are responsible 
both for making the case against a company and later for deciding whether that case has been 
sufficiently proved. It follows that if Community competition procedures are to comply with the ECHR, 
they must do so because the Court of First Instance provides the hearing required by Article 6. Insofar 
as Community fines are concerned, the Court has ‘full jurisdiction’ and this is certainly all that Article 6 
requires. However, all the other findings and orders made by the Commission in its competition 
decisions are subject only to the considerable but nonetheless limited degree of judicial review on the 
four grounds set out in Article 230 of the EC Treaty. The Court of First Instance undoubtedly goes a long 
way to inquire into and reconsider the Commission’s findings of fact and economic assessments when it 
thinks it appropriate to do so. The Court does, however, recall that it defers to the Commission’s 
economic assessments unless they are clearly incorrect or have been reached after procedural errors. It 
is therefore not completely certain that the Court can, consistently with the terms of Article 230, provide 
as full a re-hearing as might be thought necessary to fulfil the requirements of Article 6 of the 
Convention. No doubt the Court of First Instance will do everything it can to make sure that its review 
does not fall short of the standard required by Article 6. However, to resolve doubts, the possibility of 
amending Articles 229 and 230 should be considered. Similar issues arise in all of the Member States in 
which competition law fines, whether for breach of Community law or of national competition law, are 
imposed by administrative authorities and not by courts. The Commission therefore should do whatever 
is necessary, in cooperation with the national authorities to ensure that the application of Community 
competition law by national competition authorities, in accordance with the Commission’s proposals for 
decentralisation, is in all respects clearly in accordance with Article 6 of the ECHR." 
 law. Thus, Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003 allows the imposition of 
criminal sanctions under national law for breaches of Articles 81 and 82 EC. Article 12(3) 
provides that "[…] information exchanged [between national authorities] cannot be used by 
the receiving authority to impose custodial sentences". Regulation 1/2003 therefore explicitly 
acknowledges the possibility that criminal sanctions could be imposed by Member States for 
violation of EC competition rules. In practice, this is in fact what has happened in a number of 
36 It is, however, noted that whilst certain sanctions may be compatible with the classification of a charge 
as non-criminal, others – in particular imprisonment – will automatically imply that a charge is criminal 
(See i.a. Engel and Others, supra note 17 at para 82; Campbell and Fell, Judgment of 28 June 1984, 
Series A 80, at para 72.) In other words, in classifying a charge as criminal for the purposes of Article 6 
ECHR, the imposition of a certain type of sanction may be sufficient but is not necessary. 
37 See below at point under Section I.B. (iii). 
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Member States that can impose custodial sentences, individual fines and other sanctions on 
natural persons for breaches of EC competition law.38 As a result, as Article 6 ECHR is 
intended to protect against violations by public authorities of the fundamental right of access 
to justice, it is clearly appropriate to consider classification in the legal system in which the law 
is actually enforced by authorities, i.e. classification both under EC law and under national 
law. And it is arguably difficult to accept that a different classification would apply depending 
on which authority (EU or national) applies the rules. Otherwise Member States might indeed 
easily circumvent their obligations under the ECHR by delegating them to a centralised 
authority.39  
 
In conclusion, we therefore do not agree that Article 23(5) of Regulation 1/2003 settles the 
issue of domestic classification for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR.40 
 
(ii)  
− firstly, Articles 81 and 82 EC are 
Other Engel criteria 
 
To assess the nature of the offence and nature and seriousness of the penalty, the ECtHR 
case law requires consideration of the general nature of the offence, the punitive and 
deterrent nature of the penalty and the stigma attaching to the offence. Applying these criteria 
to proceedings under Article 81 and 82 EC the following can be noted: 
 
general rules applying to all undertakings
 
; 
− secondly, the central justification for EC competition law is protection of society against 
welfare loss caused by anticompetitive conduct,41 or as stated by the Commission of 
Human Rights in the Stenuit case: "the aim pursued by the impugned provisions of the 
Order of 30 June 1945 was to maintain free competition within the French market. The 
Order thus affected the general interests of society normally protected by criminal law 
(…);"42
 
  
− and finally, the fines imposed under Regulation 1/2003 have a clear punitive and 
deterrent character. This point is explicitly and repeatedly confirmed inter alia by the 
language used in the Commission’s fining guidelines.43
                                                        
38 For a comprehensive study of the situation in Member States, see inter alia, "Concurrence et droit 
penal", by various authors in Concurrences n° 1-2008, p. 1 et seq. 
39 This is mutatis mutandis also the reason why, whilst the EU is not a signatory of the ECHR, it is 
generally recognised that it is also obliged to comply with the ECHR – because the powers it has have 
been delegated by the Member States and because the key guarantees of the ECHR could otherwise 
easily be circumvented.  
40 See accordingly: A. ANDREANGELI, cited above, at p.  605; W. WILS, “The Combination…”, cited above, 
pp. 208-209. 
41 See notably A. Jones and B. Sufrin, EC Competition Law, 3rd edition, OUP, 2008, p. 44; R. Whish, 
Competition Law, Fifth edition, OUP, 2005, p. 17;  See also the Commission Guidelines on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty (2004/C101/08), at para. 33: “The aim of the Community 
competition rules is to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare 
and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources” . 
42 See Decision of the Commission of Human Rights of 27 February 1992, Société Stenuit v. France, 
1992, A/232-A. 
  
43 Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation n° 
1/2003, JO C 210, 1 September 2006. in these Guidelines, the Commission states for example that 
"fines should have a sufficiently deterrent effect, not only in order to sanction the undertakings 
concerned (specific deterrence) but also in order to deter other undertakings from engaging in, or 
continuing, behaviour that is contrary to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (general deterrence).”; “it is 
also considered appropriate to include in the fine a specific amount irrespective of the duration of the 
infringement, in order to deter companies from even entering into illegal practices."; "In addition, 
irrespective of the duration of the undertaking’s participation in the infringement, the Commission will 
include in the basic amount a sum between 15% and 25% of the value of sales as defined in Section A 
above in order to deter undertakings from even entering into horizontal price-fixing, market-sharing and 
output-limitation agreements."; "C. Specific increase for deterrence: The Commission will pay particular 
attention to the need to ensure that fines have a sufficiently deterrent effect; to that end, it may increase 
the fine to be imposed on undertakings which have a particularly large turnover beyond the sales of 
goods or services to which the infringement relates."; "Although these Guidelines present the general 
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In particular as to the seriousness of the penalty, it is hard to identify any other areas of the 
law where fines of the magnitude observed in the field of EC competition law are imposed.44
In relative terms, the sanctions imposed by the Commission for breach of Articles 81 and 82 
EC are in practice hundreds or even thousands of times higher than those in other cases 
where the ECtHR has classified proceedings as criminal in nature for the purpose of 
interpreting Article 6 ECHR.
 
 
45
But also in absolute terms, the level of fines for breach of EC competition law are generally 
economically very significant,
 
 
46 and indeed the imposition of fines for violation of EC 
competition law may (and in many cases does) result in the company that is fined going into 
liquidation.47
In this regard, it should be observed that in line with the punitive and deterrent character of 
the fines that are imposed, there is no strict relationship between these and the profits derived 
from or impact of the illegal activity (although the impact of distortions of competition is to 
some extent taken into account).
 
 
48
And the Community does not refrain from applying typical criminal law concepts such as the 
notion 
 
 
recidivism, which is treated as an aggravating factor aimed at deterring repeat 
offending by materially increasing the level of fines imposed. This is an important feature of 
the Commission's approach to fining as the very presence of the concept in this area and the 
resulting escalation of penalties point to an intent not only to deter but also to morally 
condemn the impugned behaviour, to stigmatise it and, ultimately, to treat it as criminal.49
                                                                                                                                                              
methodology for the setting of fines, the particularities of a given case or the need to achieve deterrence 
in a particular case may justify departing of a particular case from such methodology or from the limits 
specified in point 21." (emphasis added). See also Commissioner Neelie Kroes’ declarations in the 
Financial Times of 29 November 2007 about the fines imposed by the Commission in the new flat glass 
cartel: "the important thing is that the fine as a whole is sufficiently deterrent, so that none of these 
companies will be tempted to infringe the rules again." 
 
44 It appears for example that fines imposed in the US for tax evasion, which is the most serious federal 
tax crime, can only reach a maximum amount of 250.000$, whereas the most serious corporate crime 
possible would be subject to sanctions raising until 290.000$. These sanctions are thus far less 
important than those which may be imposed for serious antitrust violations, and this tendency seems to 
be even more obvious in Europe, where the maximum penalties that can be imposed for antitrust 
violations are higher than in the US and Japan. Sources:  http://law.jrank.org/pages/1065/Economic-
Crime-Tax-Offenses-role-criminal-sanctions.html; and 
http://www.anu.edu.au/fellows/jbraithwaite/_documents/Articles/Penalties_White_1992.pdf; last visit on 
21-08-2008.  
45 See for example the Stenuit case, cited above, where the fine imposed was 50.000 FRF. See also 
Bendenoun v. France, cited above, where the tax surcharges which were imposed were considered as 
"very substantial" by the ECtHR as they amounted to FRF 422,534 (approximately 64.000 €) in respect 
of Mr Bendenoun personally and FRF 570,398 (approximately 87.000 €) in respect of his company. 
46 Fines imposed are frequently of the order of a thousand times, and occasionally ten thousand times, 
the average per capita GDP across the 27 Member States. According to the Commission's statistics the 
per capita GDP in 2007 was 24.800 EUR. Source: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1073,46870091&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTA
L&p_product_code=TEC00001 (last visit: 21-8-2008) 
47 For instance, in the District Heating Cartel case the fines led to liquidation for numbers 2 and 3 on the 
market, the companies Løgstør Rør and Tarco. 
48 Thus –according to the fining guidelines–, in determining the basic account of the fine to be imposed, 
the Commission will take the value of the undertaking's sales to which the infringement relates into 
account. The Commission will also take into account the need to increase the fine in order to exceed the 
amounts of gains improperly made. 
49 “(from latin recidivus "recurring", from re- "back" + cado "I fall"), is the act of a person repeating an 
undesirable behavior after they have either experienced negative consequences of that behavior, or 
have been treated or trained to extinguish that behavior. The term is most frequently used in conjunction 
with substance abuse and criminal behavior. For example, scientific literature may refer to the recidivism 
of sexual offenders, meaning the frequency with which they are detected or apprehended committing 
additional sexual crimes after being released from prison for similar crimes.” (Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Recidivism). 
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Indeed, the word "recidivism" itself is by definition associated with compulsive criminal 
behaviour. Thus, standard dictionary definitions of the term include "the habit of relapsing into 
crime",50 "a tendency to relapse into a previous condition or mode of behavior; especially: 
relapse into criminal behaviour."51 The ECtHR has in the past explicitly stated that fining 
policies designed to deter re-offending are indicative of "criminal charges" within the meaning 
of Article 6 ECHR.52
Other aspects such as the introduction of leniency policies at EC and Member State level 
appears relevant in this regard.
 
 
53  
 
Finally, in relation to the stigma
Thus, a number of Member States have formally criminalised certain types of competition law 
violations
 attaching to violations of competition law, for the purposes of 
analysis this question can be looked at from the point of view of presentation (i.e. how such 
offences are presented to the public by relevant authorities), perception (i.e. the public 
reaction to such offences) and consequences (i.e. the consequences for businesses and 
individuals of violations of competition law with which they are associated).  
 
These three elements of presentation, perception and consequence are dynamic and 
interrelated. However, as a general observation, there has been a very marked tendency over 
the past decade in particular for violations of competition law to be presented increasingly as 
an extremely serious form of attack on society, carrying grave consequences, and one to 
which members of the public should not only be concerned about but also react to.  
 
54 and in certain cases provide for imprisonment,55 or in any event apply significantly 
higher fines than in the past.56 Other types of sanctions also exist, for example in the UK, 
where individuals involved in violations of EC or national competition law may be temporarily 
prevented from acting as company director,57
Beyond these formal sanctions, there may also be other consequences for 
 i.e. a restriction on such individuals' freedom to 
undertake a certain profession. 
 
individuals
                                                        
50 Oxford English Dictionary. 
51 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary.  
 
involved in violations of EC competition law, in particular, reputational and career 
consequences. It is not, however, possible to quantify this type of effect since very little 
information on the fall out of EC competition law violations that affects individuals is reported 
52 See Neste St. Petersburg v. Russia, below at note 68.  
53 See G. Parleani, "La sanction pénale des pratiques anticoncurentielles", Concurrences n°1-2008, p. 
3, at paras 5-6. 
54 See L. Idot, "Concurrence et droit pénal", "Le droit des Etats members de l'Union européenne" in 
Concurrences n° 1-2008, p. 14 et seq. 
55 See footnote 116 infra. 
56   Even if several countries have introduced criminal sanctions against individuals engaging in 
anticompetitive conduct, it seems that no individual in Europe had received a custodial sentence for a 
competition law offence until 2006, when an Irish court sentenced an individual to a period of six 
months’ imprisonment, suspended for a period of 12 months, in connection with an Irish heating oil 
cartel that operated in the west of Ireland. The UK is expected to follow by imposing custodial sentences 
to the businessmen found guilty in the Marine Hose Cartel case after they had already been condemned 
by the US DoJ to prison sentences ranging from 20 months to two and a half year. It is worth noting 
however that the maximum penalty in the UK is five years’ imprisonment compared with the maximum of 
10 years’ imprisonment in the US. Source: S. Ince & G. Christian, “United Kingdom: The Marine Hose 
Cartel: A New Era in International Co-operation”, Competition law insight of 12 February 2008, available 
at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=57462, last visited on 21-8-2008. 
57 Section 204 of the Entreprise Act 2002 amends the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 and 
provides for disqualification orders against a company director if : “(a) his conduct contributed to the 
breach of competition law mentioned in subsection (2); (b) his conduct did not contribute to the breach 
but he had reasonable grounds to suspect that the conduct of the undertaking constituted the breach 
and he took no steps to prevent it; (c) he did not know but ought to have known that the conduct of the 
undertaking constituted the breach” (§6). It is immaterial whether the person knew that the conduct of 
the undertaking constituted the breach (§7). The maximum period of disqualification is 15 years (§9). 
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in the press. Nonetheless, there is evidence that implication in such violations often result in 
individuals losing their positions within their company.58
Neelie Kroes, EC Commissioner for Competition
 
 
As regards the rhetoric used against persons that violate EC competition law, it is not the 
purpose of this article to exhaustively analyse the speeches of public officials charged with 
implementation. However, as a general observation, violations of EC competition law are 
presented by enforcers as very serious, as an attack on society and as "comparable with 
theft". A number of quotes are set out below to illustrate this point: 
 
 "I do believe that we need to begin changing general perception of the competition 
rules. […] It is up to us to show that when we break up cartels, it is to stop money 
being stolen from customers’ pockets." 
 
59
John Fingleton, UK OFT Chief Executive
 
 
 "Cartels involve substantial theft and economic harm"  
 
60
Joel Klein, US Assistant Attorney General
 
 
 "cartels are like theft, criminalisation makes the punishment fit what is indeed a crime" 
 
John Vickers, UK OFT Chairman 
 
 "Cartels are like cancers on the open market economy, which forms the very basis of 
our Community […]" 
Mario Monti, ex-Commissioner for Competition 
 
"[l]et me be very clear: these cartels are the equivalent of theft by well-dressed 
thieves, and they deserve unequivocal public condemnation." 
 
61
In addition to presenting violations of EC competition law as very serious, the above quotes 
also point to a policy of altering public perception of such offences.
 
 
62
                                                        
58 See, for example, the resignation of two executives of British Airways following the imposition by the 
European Commission of a 300 million GBP fine for price fixing 
  
 
The above observations demonstrate a clear EC policy to stigmatise violations of EC 
competition law through the way in which the offences are presented to the public and the 
consequences of their breach. 
 
Actual public reaction to and perception of anticompetitive conduct constitutes another 
dimension of the stigma attaching to an offence. This is clearly a more difficult aspect to 
measure.  
 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/main.jhtml?xml=/money/2006/10/09/bcnba09.xml (same example: 
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/breaking/2008/0807/breaking69.htm). 
59 International Bar Association/European Commission Conference ‘Anti-trust reform in Europe: a year 
in practice’, Taking Competition Seriously – Anti-Trust Reform in Europe, Brussels, 10 March 2005. 
60 John Fingleton, Marie-Barbe Girard and Simon Williams, "The fight against cartels: is a ‘mixed’ 
approach to enforcement the answer?", Title II, in 2006 Fordham Comp. L. Inst. 10 (B. Hawk ed. 2007).  
61 The war against international cartels: lessons from the battlefront. Speech presented at Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute 26th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law & Policy New York, 
October 14, 1999. 
62 Another significant strand of this policy in recent years, is the active encouragement of private 
enforcement of EC competition law, which has occurred both at EC and national level, inter alia so as to 
ensure higher deterrence. Notably, the Commission published in April 2008 its White Paper on private 
enforcement (White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 2 April 2008 Doc 
COM (2008) 165 final ) which stresses that damage actions ought to produce "beneficial effects in terms 
of deterrence of future infringements and greater compliance with EC antitrust rules". 
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For example, around the time of the overhaul of the national competition rules in the UK, the 
legislative developments were profiled by the UK government as tackling "rip-off Britain" and 
in some cases the media were prepared to confirm broadly that "There is no doubt that British 
consumers have the impression they are regularly being ripped off by international cartels 
using cynical price-fixing measures to steal the last penny out of their wallets."63
In the words of one Commission official who has published extensively on this subject “it 
appears difficult to deny that the application of the criteria set out in the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights leads to the conclusion that proceedings based on 
Regulation No 1/2003, leading to decisions in which the Commission finds violations of 
Articles 81 or 82 EC, orders their termination and imposes fines relate to “the determination of 
a criminal charge” within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR.”
 
 
In conclusion on the above, it follows from consideration of the nature of EC competition law, 
the nature and severity of the sanctions resulting from and stigma attaching to its violation, 
that EC competition law proceedings should be treated as "criminal charges" within the 
meaning of Article 6 ECHR, as interpreted using the Engel criteria laid down by the ECtHR. 
 
64
In the Stenuit case, concerning proceedings led by the French competition authorities, the 
Human Rights Commission classified these proceedings as criminal for the purposes of 
Article 6 ECHR, explicitly rejecting the French government’s arguments to the contrary. The 
Human Rights Commission noted that “the aim pursued by the impugned provisions of the 
Order of 30 June 1945 was to maintain free competition within the French market. The Order 
thus affected the general interests of society normally protected by criminal law (…). The 
penalties imposed by the Minister were measures directed against firms or corporate bodies 
which had committed acts constituting “infractions”. The Commission further points out that 
the Minister could refer the case to the prosecuting authorities, with a view to their instituting 
criminal proceedings against the ‘contrevenant’.”
 
 
As we shall see in the following section, this analysis is furthermore confirmed by the ECtHR 
and the Human Rights Commission’s own case-law, as well as the case-law of a number of 
national supreme courts in the Member States. 
 
2. Case law of the ECtHR and European Human Rights Commission supporting the 
criminal charges classification 
 
65
 “[i]n the present case the penalty imposed by the Minister was a fine of 50.000 FRF 
[7.620 € approximately], a sum which, in itself is not negligible. But it is above all the 
fact that the maximum fine, i.e. the penalty to which those responsible for 
infringements made themselves liable, was 5% of the annual turnover for a firm and 
5.000.000 FRF [762.000 € approximately] for other ‘contrevenants’ which shows quite 
clearly that the penalty in question was intended to be deterrent.”
 
 
With regard to the nature and the severity of the penalty to which those responsible for 
infringements made themselves liable, the Human Rights Commission went on to observe 
that: 
 
66
The Human Rights Commission therefore concluded in this case that the Minister’s decision 
to impose a fine constituted, for the purposes of Article 6 ECHR, determination of a "criminal 
charge" and that the fine in question had to be regarded as a criminal penalty. The case was 
finally not adjudicated by the ECtHR, as the applicant and the French government settled the 
 
 
                                                        
63 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/661476.stm  
64 W. WILS, cited above, p. 209. See also C. D. EHLERMANN, "Developments in Community Competition 
Law Procedures", EC Competition Policy Newsletter, Vol. 1, n° 1, p. 2. 
65 HR Commission Report of 30 May 1991 in Société Stenuit v. France, cited above, at paras. 62-64. 
66 Ibidem. 
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case. Indeed, the infringements that had been found had largely been remedied after the 
creation of the French Competition Council (Conseil de la Concurrence).67
In another case, Neste St. Petersburg v. Russia,
  
 
68
In a more recent case Jussila v. Finland,
 the ECtHR considered that the antitrust 
proceedings led by the Russian authorities were not “criminal” in nature, but this was due to 
the fact that Russian competition law only “empowers the antimonopoly bodies to impose 
administrative sanctions (…) for obstructing the authorities investigations and do not serve as 
punishment for substantive antimonopoly violations.” Furthermore, the ECtHR noted that 
“section 6-1 of the Competition Law, under which the applicant companies were charged, 
does not provide for any specific sanctions as such” and that the confiscation order to which 
the applicant companies were subjected “is intended as pecuniary compensation for damage 
rather than as a punishment to deter re-offending.” (emphasis added) 
 
69 the ECtHR reviewed its previous case-law and 
confirmed that: 
 
 “the autonomous interpretation adopted by the Convention institutions of the notion of 
a “criminal charge” by applying the Engel criteria have underpinned a gradual 
broadening of the criminal head to cases not strictly belonging to the traditional 
categories of the criminal law, for example administrative penalties (Öztürk v. 
Germany), prison disciplinary proceedings (…) competition law
Thus, in the RioTintoZinc Case for instance, the House of Lords found that EU competition 
fines were "penalties" and that therefore the principle of non-self-incrimination applied under 
the Civil Evidence Act.
 (Société Stenuit v. 
France, …) and penalties imposed by a court with jurisdiction in financial matters 
(…).”  
 
It is thus clear from this review of ECtHR case-law, as well as of decisions of the Human 
Rights Commission, that competition proceedings, in the course of which the Commission 
takes a decision imposing fines on undertakings, are to be qualified as "criminal" under Article 
6 ECHR. 
 
3.  Case law of national courts supporting the criminal charges classification 
 
The position of the ECtHR referred to above has meanwhile been endorsed by a number of 
the highest courts in the Member States. 
 
70 The French Constitutional Court has also stressed the gravity of 
antitrust fines and therefore that all the principles attaching to the rights of defence apply71
                                                        
67 Decision of the Human Rights Commission of 27 February 1992 in Société Stenuit v. France, cited 
above. See also the Human Rights Commission decision of 9 February 1990 in M. & Co. v. Germany, 
App. n° 13258/87, where the question arose whether, “by giving effect to a judgment reached in 
proceedings that allegedly violated Article 6, the Federal Republic of Germany incurred responsibility 
under the Convention on account of the fact that these proceedings against a German company were 
possible only because the Federal Republic has transferred its powers in this sphere to the European 
Communities”. The Human Rights Commission found in this case that “for the purpose of the 
examination of this question it can be assumed that the anti-trust proceedings in question would fall 
under Article 6 (…) had they be conducted by German and not by European judicial authorities.” This 
reasoning seems to be guided only by the fact that the EC was not itself a party to the Convention 
reasoning which may not be applicable today anymore (see infra). 
68 Judgment of 3 June 2004, App. n° 69042, 69050, 69054, 69055, 69056, and 69058/01 
69 Judgment of the ECtHR of 23 November 2006, Jussila v. Finland, App. n° 73053/01, emphasis 
added. 
70 [1978] (ML Rep. 100). 
71 See e.g. decision of 22-23 January 1987, JORF, 25 January 1987, p. 924; see also J-C and J-L. 
FOURGOUX, "Le Conseil de la concurrence dans la vie économique et juridique de l'Europe", GP, 26-
27 September 1990, p-12,13).  
 
and the French Cour de Cassation went so far as to rule that the participation of the 
rapporteur in the deliberation of the Conseil de la concurrence, to the extent he has 
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undertaken investigations during the fact-finding process, was contrary to Article 6(1) 
ECHR.72
In a number of early cases, the ECJ was clearly reluctant to accept the applicability of Article 
6 ECHR to such proceedings.
 
 
4. Case law of the ECJ on the criminal charges classification 
 
Whilst there is thus wide support for the proposition that competition proceedings in which 
fines are imposed are to be qualified as "criminal" under Article 6 ECHR, the case-law of the 
ECJ to date remains unclear in this regard. 
 
73
 “ [i]n view of the fact – in my view confirmed to some extent by the judgment of the 
Court of Human Rights in the Öztürk case – that fines which may be imposed on 
undertakings pursuant to Article 15 of Regulation No 17/62 do in fact, notwithstanding 
what is stated in Article 15(4), 
 The case-law showed however progressively an inclination to 
accept that this was the case. Thus, in the first series of cases brought before the newborn 
CFI, Judge Vesterdorf acting as Advocate General argued that: 
 
have a criminal law character, it is vitally important that 
the Court should seek to bring about a state of legal affairs not susceptible of any 
justified criticism with reference to the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights. At all events, the framework formed by the existing body of rules and 
the judgements handed down hitherto it must therefore be sought to ensure that legal 
protection meets the standard otherwise regarded as reasonable in Europe.”74
 “[i]t cannot be disputed – and the Commission does not dispute – that, in the light of 
the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the opinions of the 
European Commission of Human Rights, the present case involves a ‘criminal 
charge’.”
  
 
This issue was not further discussed by the CFI in this case, but in further case-law the ECJ 
was inclined to follow Judge Vesterdorf’s appraisal. In Baustahlgewebe for example, 
Advocate General Léger considered that: 
 
75
                                                        
72 See D. Waelbroeck and M. Griffiths "French Cour de Cassaction: TGV Nord et Pont de Normandie, 
Judgment of 5 October 1999" case-note in 37 CMLR (2000) pp. 1465-1476. 
73 Advocate General Mayras, already found in his Opinion delivered on 29 October 1975 in case 26/75, 
General Motors v. Commission [1975] ECR p. 1367, that “[a]lthough in the strict sense of the term the 
fines prescribed by regulation n° 17 are not in the nature of criminal-law sanctions, I do not consider it 
possible, in interpreting the term ‘intentionally’, to disregard the concepts which are commonly accepted 
in the penal legislation of the Member States.” This view was however not widely shared. Thus, even 
after the Öztürk judgment Advocate General Darmon considered that "it does not seem (…) to be 
blindingly clear that the Öztürk judgment should be seen as being so far-reaching that the concept of 
'charged with a criminal offence' within the meaning of the Convention should be taken to extend to 
undertakings which are the subject of administrative proceedings intended to determine whether or not 
they have committed an infringement of competition rules." (Opinion of Advocate General Darmon 
delivered on 18 May 1989 in Case 347/87 Orkem v. Commission [1989] ECR p. 3301, at para. 137). In 
the same case, the ECJ seemed to take at least a more careful approach in its judgement by stating that 
"[a]s far as Article 6 of the European Convention is concerned, although it may be relied upon by an 
undertaking subject to an investigation relating to competition law, it must be observed that neither the 
wording of that article nor the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights indicate that it upholds 
the right not to give evidence against oneself."( Judgement of the Court of 18 October 1989 in Case 
347/89, Orkem v. Commission, cited above, at para. 30 (emphasis added). Note that in the French 
version (which was the original language of the case), the Court only stated the following: « En ce qui 
concerne l’article 6 de la Convention européenne, en admettant qu’il puisse être invoqué par une 
entreprise objet d’une enquête en matière de droit de la concurrence, il convient de constater qu’il ne 
résulte ni de son libellé ni de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme que cette 
disposition reconnaisse un droit de na pas témoigner contre soi-même. » (emphasis added)). 
74 Opinion of Judge Vesterdorf, acting as Advocate General, in Case T-1/89 Rhône Poulenc S.A. v. 
Commission [1991] ECR II-867, at p. 885 (emphasis added) 
75 Opinion of Advocate General Léger in Case C-185/95 P, Baustahlgwebe v. Commission [1998] ECR 
I-8422, at para. 31. 
 
 
 16 
At para. 21 of its judgment in that case, the ECJ accordingly concluded that: 
 
 “the general principle of Community law that everyone is entitled to fair legal process, 
which is inspired by those fundamental rights (…), and in particular the right to legal 
process within a reasonable period, is applicable in the context of proceedings 
brought against a Commission decision imposing fines on an undertaking for 
infringement of competition law.”76
 "[…] it is certainly true that the right to be heard by a tribunal and the right to a fair 
trial, as they result, in particular from Article 6(1) ECHR, are among the fundamental 
rights which , according to the Court's consistent case law, also confirmed by the 
preamble to the Single European Act and by article F(2) of the Treaty of the 
European Union (now, after modification, article 6(2) EU), are protected in the 
Community legal order and that, having regard to the nature of the infractions in 
question as well as the nature and the degree of severity of the sanctions they give 
rise to, undertakings accused of violations of the competition rules that have been 
imposed fines must for this reason enjoy the guarantees that are provided for 
procedures of a penal character."
 
 
In Hüls, the ECJ explicitly stated:  
 
77
However, recent cases have again been less receptive to the idea that antitrust fines were 
criminal charges. Thus in Volkswagen,
 
 
78 the ECJ rejected the argument that, in order to 
establish that an infringement was international in nature, the person having acted improperly 
should have been identified since under Article 15 (4) of Regulation 17, "decisions imposing 
[…] a fine are not of a criminal law nature" and "were the appellant's view to be upheld, this 
would infringe seriously on the effectiveness of  Community competition law". On the basis of 
this relatively unclear statement, the CFI in Compagnie Maritime Belge79
                                                        
76 Judgment of the ECJ of 17 December 1998 in Case C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe v. Commission 
[1998] ECR I-8422, at para. 21. 
77 Free translation by the authors from the original French text "[…] il est certes vrai que le droit d'être 
entendu par un tribunal et le droit à un procès équitable, tels qu'ils résultent notamment de l'article 6, 
paragraphe 1, de la CEDH, font partie des droits fondamentaux qui, selon la jurisprudence constante de 
la Cour, par ailleurs réaffirmée par le préambule de l'Acte unique européenne et par l'article F, 
paragraphe 2, du traité sur l'Union européenne (devenu, après modification, article 6, paragraphe 2, 
UE), sont protégés dans l'ordre juridique communautaire et que, eu égard à la nature des infractions en 
cause ainsi qu'à la nature et au degré de sévérité des sanctions qui s'y rattachent, les entreprises 
accusées de violations des règles de concurrence qui se sont vu infliger des amendes pour ce motif 
doivent bénéficier des garanties qui sont prévues pour les procédures à caractère pénal." Order of the 
Court of 16 Decembre 1999 in Case C-137/92 P-DEP, Hüls v. Commission, not published, referring to 
judgment of the Court of 8 July 1999 in Case C-199/92 P, Hüls v. Commission [1999] ECR I-4383, at 
para. 150. See also the Judgment of the CFI of 6 October 2005 in Joined cases T-22/02 and T-23/02, 
Sumitomo Chemical v. Commission [2005] ECR II-4065, at para. 105; the Judgment of the Court of 11 
January 2000 in Joined Cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P, van der Wal [2000] ECR I-1 para. 17; and 
the recent Opinion of AG Kokott in case 280/06, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v. 
ETI an others, not yet published, at para 71: “The consequence of the sanctionative nature of measures 
imposed by competition authorities for punishing cartel offences – in particular fines – is that the area is 
at least akin to criminal law.” 
78 Judgment of the ECJ of 19 September 2003 in Case C-338/00 P, Volkswagen, [2003], ECR I-9189, at 
para 97. 
79 Judgment of the CFI of 1st July 2008, in Case T-276/04, Compagnie Maritime Belge, not yet 
published, at para 66. 
 confirmed that 
antitrust fines were not of a criminal nature as deciding otherwise, this would "infringe 
seriously on the effectiveness of Communitiy competition law". It is underlined that the 
effectiveness of the law is not among the Engel criteria affecting criminal classification. 
Moreover, it is unclear what "effectiveness" should be read to mean in this context. If it is to 
be understood as meaning that criminalisation may (significantly) reduce the number of 
(successful) prosecutions, that is of course possible. However, the same might be said of 
many other undoubtedly criminal areas of the law. Were theft to be treated as non-criminal, 
for example, and the relevant procedural safeguards dispensed with, there would almost 
certainly be a sharp increase in the number of prosecutions (particularly if the police were 
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granted the power to prosecute and judge the cases themselves). This would, however, be to 
the detriment of the quality and soundness of decisions, and in the medium to long term the 
credibility of the justice system. It is also noted that there are of course plenty of examples of 
legal systems that formally criminalise competition law and offer the corresponding 
safeguards, but without finding that the system collapses or grinds to a halt.  
 
5. Arguments against the criminal charges classification 
 
Having considered in detail above the reasons why EC competition law proceedings must be 
regarded as involving criminal charges within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR, it seems to us 
that none of the counter-arguments that are or could be invoked against this position are 
decisive. Article 23(5) of Regulation 1/2003 is most often quoted in this context but as 
indicated above, the contention that Article 23(5) of Regulation 1/2003 somehow settles the 
question of classification of EC competition law proceedings is clearly inaccurate.80 The main 
other arguments against a classification of competition law proceedings as involving criminal 
charges are discussed below: 
 
(i)  
However, a general appeal to traditional conceptions of what is criminal does not appear 
particularly rigorous and fails to take into account evolution of society. Fifty years ago the 
notion of environmental crime basically did not exist. One hundred years ago selling opium 
was in many countries not regarded as criminal. Two hundred years ago, slavery was in many 
countries not regarded as criminal. But three hundred years ago anticompetitive conduct was 
already regarded as criminal in England and similar examples can be cited bank to the 
Roman Empire, where at times certain market distorting behaviour carried the death 
penalty,
Competition law is not part of the "core" criminal law 
 
One objection to the conclusion that EC competition law proceedings involve a criminal 
charge under Article 6 ECHR is that they are not "traditionally" looked on as criminal, or do 
not constitute "core" criminal offences. 
 
81
Reflecting the dynamic nature of criminal law, the ECHR generally interpreted in a dynamic 
manner,
 which arguably means the "traditional" epithet is in fact justified. 
 
82
True, EC competition law violations are obviously not on a par with horrific crimes such as 
murder or rape. However, as has been seen above, they are frequently equated with the 
more traditional and familiar crime of theft.
 and the concept of criminal Article 6 ECHR specifically must take into account 
evolving perceptions (as discussed above, for example, the Engel criteria refer among others 
to "stigma", not fifty years ago but today). 
 
Moreover, ECtHR case law explicitly recognises that Article 6 ECHR is not intended to be 
limited to crimes that have been around for a "long time". As the ECtHR observed in the 
Jussila case quoted above: “the autonomous interpretation adopted by the Convention 
institutions of the notion of a “criminal charge” by applying the Engel criteria have 
underpinned a gradual broadening of the criminal head to cases not strictly belonging to the 
traditional categories of the criminal law, for example […] competition law (Société Stenuit v. 
France, …)".  
 
83
                                                        
80 See supra Section I.B.1(i).  
81 See Wilberforce, Campbell and Elles (1966) The Law of Restrictive Practices and Monopolies. 
  
 
It follows that appeals to tradition in the classification of offences under the criminal head of 
Article 6 ECHR is misplaced. 
 
A more balanced variation of this argument is that, although competition law violations may 
fall under the criminal head of Article 6 ECHR, they are not "core" offences or serious enough 
to warrant the full gamut of protections offered under that provision. 
82 See the judgment of the ECtHR in Jussila v. Finland, cited above fn. 69. 
83 See above at Section I.B.1(ii). 
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As a preliminary remark, Article 6 ECHR itself distinguishes only between civil and criminal 
heads, and lays down clear criteria for determining which of these applies. As discussed 
above, in the case of EC competition law, it is undoubtedly the criminal head that applies. 
Within the criminal head of Article 6 ECHR
(ii) 
, the ECtHR's case law does in fact distinguish 
between minor and disciplinary offences and other offences falling under the criminal head. 
This distinction is considered in detail below. However, it is worth noting here that, although 
there is clearly a sliding scale of seriousness of offences, the relative positioning of offences 
on that scale is – except in extreme cases – highly subjective. It is therefore logical and 
appropriate that the ECtHR does not seek to make legal distinctions between, for example's 
sake, a fully fledged "force 10" criminal offence and a mere "force 8.5" criminal offence, with a 
fixed list of procedural rights attaching to the former and a shorter list of procedural rights 
attaching to the latter. Such distinctions would, in our view, be arbitrary in the extreme. 
 
No prison sentences are imposed by the Commission and moreover sanctions 
are imposed on companies not individuals84
However, there are again a number of flaws with this argument, and mainly the fact that 
fulfilment of the Engel criteria does not require the possible imposition of prison sentences. 
Under the Engel criteria the nature and severity of sanctions is considered. Whilst the 
imposition of prison sentences would be sufficient to classify related offences as criminal 
within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR, it is certainly not a necessary condition and offences 
can be considered as criminal where 'only' fines are imposed.
 
 
Another argument made to support the theory that EC law is not "real" criminal law, is that 
sanctions are imposed on companies only and that no prison sentences are involved. 
 
85
Finally, as is well known, the ECHR does not distinguish between natural and legal persons 
as regards the rights they enjoy under Article 6 ECHR.
 
 
In any event, as discussed above, prison sentences can in fact result from violations of EC 
competition law, where these are imposed by Member States' courts. 
 
86 
 
Nothing in this argument therefore puts in doubt the criminal classification of EC competition 
law proceedings under Article 6 ECHR. 
 
Again, it could be argued that, whilst EC competition law clearly falls under the criminal head 
of Article 6 ECHR, within that criminal head
(iii) 
 there are offences of varying degrees of 
seriousness that merit different levels of procedural rights. However, beyond the basic 
distinction operated between minor and non-minor offences that is considered in greater 
detail below, such an argument is, in our opinion, no more valid in this context than in the 
context of an argument based on "traditional/core" and "non-traditional/non-core" offences 
(see above). 
 
Procedural safeguards are inferior to those offered in criminal proceedings87
                                                        
84 "Individuals are not at risk. Nobody goes to prison or gets a criminal record. The Commission may fine 
only business entities." http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1995_044_en.html 
85 See above, note 31. See also e.g. Wils, “Is Criminalisation of EU competition law the Answer”, at 
point 2.1. "Whereas fines can be either criminal or civil or administrative, imprisonment appears to be 
essentially a criminal sanction. The possibility of a prison sanction does not seem top be a necessary 
condition for a prohibited act or for an enforcement procedure to be criminal, but it is certainly a 
sufficient condition." 
 
 
86 See for example the judgment of the ECtHR of 7 July 1989, Tre Traktörer AB, Application no. 
10873/84, at para. 35. For more on locus standi of legal persons under the Convention see P. VAN DIJK, 
F. VAN HOOF, A. VAN RIJN and L. ZWAAK, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (4th ed.), supra note 26, pp.52-55; See also Wils, “Is Criminalisation of EU competition law the 
Answer?”, at point 2.1 "Individual penalties are however neither a necessary not a sufficient condition for 
enforcement to be criminal." 
87 See e.g. W. Wils, “Is Criminalisation of EU Competition Law the Answer?”, at point 2.6. 
 19 
The argument that procedural safeguards in antitrust cases are inferior to those offered in 
criminal proceedings and therefore support the view that such proceedings are not criminal is 
logically flawed. It would be circular to refer to the very procedures, whose legality is under 
examination, to assist in determining the standards that they should respect. 
 
Thus, under the ECHR, the classification of an offence as criminal must result in certain 
procedural safeguards. The reverse, however, is not always true. In other words, the absence 
of those safeguards might well indicate that an offence is not criminal, but it could equally 
indicate that the state is simply not offering the safeguards that it should be. 
 
One variation on this argument is that in a "true" criminal context, suspects get a tougher time 
than they do in EC competition proceedings. Thus, for example, individuals may be cross-
examined in court by hostile prosecutors, investigative powers of relevant authorities are 
more significant, there is trial by jury, the prospect of jail sentences etc.88
Moreover, it must be emphasised that being subjected to a Commission competition 
investigation is hardly a pleasant experience. Vast quantities of documents are demanded by 
the Commission, initial failure to cooperate with investigations (by, for example, invoking the 
right to silence or legal privilege) regularly results in threats of criminal sanctions at which 
point individuals will often submit. This practice was indeed recently condemned by the Court 
of First Instance in the Akzo case
 These arguments 
suffer from similar logical failures to those discussed in the preceding paragraph. Thus, the 
way procedures are designed results from the process of classification and not vice versa.  
 
89
 "With regard to the first step, the applicants submit that the Commission forced them 
to reveal the contents of the documents in question although they had claimed that 
they were covered by [legal privilege]. Following disclosure of those documents, long 
discussions ensued between the applicants’ in-house counsel and the Commission 
as to the procedure to be followed for examining those documents. The Commission 
informed the applicants that any further delay in the handing over and examination of 
 in the following terms: 
 
                                                        
88 An example of this argument can be found in the following text by ex Commission official Julian 
Joshua (in Attitudes to Anti-trust Enforcement in the EU and US, Dodging the Traffic Warden, or 
Respecting the Law? See http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1995_044_en.html). 
The text is extensively quoted here because it is a good example of an attempt to validate a logically 
flawed argument through repetition (argumentum via repititio): 
 
 "Just so we are under no illusion, let us remember how a real criminal enforcement system 
operates. In the United States the Justice Department always prosecutes suspected price fixers 
criminally. The primary investigative instrument is the Grand Jury. Targeted individuals are summoned 
for examination on oath by hostile prosecutors without benefit of judge or counsel. Vast quantities of 
documents are subpoenaed. Corporations cannot hide behind the Fifth Amendment, and individuals 
who invoke the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination may find themselves obliged to testify 
nevertheless under strictly limited court-ordered immunity. Failure to cooperate will mean prosecution for 
contempt of court, obstruction of justice or perjury. Remember too that the Justice Department now 
often calls on the FBI to assist: house searches, consensual telephone monitoring, sending turned 
conspirators "wired up" into cartel meetings - these are commonly employed to gather evidence. And of 
course a Sherman Act indictment can well be reinforced by prosecutors adding a racketeering or wire 
fraud count. Grand Juries, it should be said, almost always find a "true bill", i.e. they vote to indict.  
 
 The criminal trial itself is usually before a Federal jury - that is, if the accused plead not guilty. 
Almost invariably where the evidence is convincing they will seek a plea bargain on the best terms they 
can get. The Justice Department on conviction will always press for a prison term as well as fines: under 
recent amendments it is a felony and the jail sentence can be up to three years.  
 
 A jury verdict is final as to the facts. One can go to the Circuit Court of Appeals, but while most 
appeals are on evidentiary questions, they are concerned with narrow questions of admissibility or the 
adequacy of the judge's directions to the jury. As long as there was some evidence on which to convict, 
the Appeal Court does not go into the facts." 
 
 
89 Joined cases T-125/03 and T-253/03, Akzo v. Commission, ECR [2007], not yet reported, at points 
63, 94 and 95. 
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the documents would amount to obstruction of the investigation and could constitute 
a criminal offence under section 65 of the UK Competition Act, which is punishable by 
a term of imprisonment and a fine. It was only under strong protest that the applicants 
handed the Set B documents to the Commission for examination. Furthermore, 
during the investigation the Commission inspectors read and described to each other 
the contents of the Set A and Set B documents for several minutes at a time. 
 
 […] 
 
 It is also apparent from the report and the minutes mentioned above that the 
Commission insisted on taking a cursory look at those documents and that the 
applicants’ representatives only agreed to this after the Commission and the OFT 
officials informed them that refusal to allow them to do so would be tantamount to 
obstructing the investigation, an action which would be punishable by administrative 
and criminal penalties. 
 
 95. In those circumstances, the Court considers that the Commission forced the 
applicants to accept the cursory look at the disputed documents, even though, as 
regards the two copies of the typewritten memorandum in Set A and the handwritten 
notes in Set B, the applicants’ representatives claimed, and provided supporting 
justification, that such an examination would require the contents of those documents 
to be disclosed." 
 
For individuals involved in the investigation, there may also be the possibility that they will be 
criminally pursued by Member State authorities. 
 
(iv)  
As indicated above, in Volkswagen,
Application of Article 6 ECHR "would impringe seriously on the effectiveness of 
Community competition law" 
 
90
It is worrying however to see as a quite general and recent development fundamental rights to 
be purely set aside, temporarily suspended or simply diminished for the declared purpose of 
attaining objectives such as the “good administration of justice” or the “effectiveness of the 
law”. Such attempts have already been fiercely criticized by supreme courts in Europe and in 
the US in the context of the so-called “war on terror”.
 the ECJ found that if decisions imposing a competition 
fine were to be regarded as of a criminal law nature, "this would impinge seriously on the 
effectiveness of community competition law". 
 
This argument, which has already been commented on above, is hardly more convincing than 
the previous one. The more serious the offence, the more necessary it is to comply with 
procedural safeguards. Arguments of administrative efficiency or convenience are hardly 
sufficient to warrant infringements of fundamental rights. These arguments cannot affect the 
finding of the ECtHR inter alia in Jussila that competition law procedures have to respect the 
basic requirements of Article 6 ECHR. 
 
91
                                                        
90 Judgment of the ECJ of 18 September 2003, in case C-338/00 P, Volkswagen, [2003], ECR I-9189, 
point 97; see also Judgment of the CFI of 1st July 2008, in case T-276/04, Compagnie Maritime Belge, 
para.66. 
91 See the US Supreme Court rulings in Rasul v. Bush 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Boumediene v. Bush 553 
U.S. __ (2008); Al Odah v. United States 542 U.S. 466 (2004); in the EU see the CFI judgments in 
cases T-229/02, PKK v. Council, not yet published; T-256/07, People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran 
v. Council, not yet published; T-327/03, Al Aqsa v. Council, not yet published; T-47/03, Sison v. Council, 
not yet published; T-228/02, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d'Iran v. Council [2006] ECR p. 
II-4665; see also the Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in case 402/05 P, Kadi v. Council and 
Commission, not yet published. 
 There is no reason therefore to see 
why this would constitute a more valid argument in the field of EU competition law.  
 
6. Conclusion 
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On the basis of the above, we conclude that EC competition law proceedings leading to fines 
can only be considered as "criminal" within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR. In the next section 
we will now look at the main consequence of this finding for the conduct of these proceedings. 
 
II. Criminal charges must generally be heard at first instance by an independent and 
impartial tribunal, EC competition law is no exception 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The right to a fair trial as embodied in Article 6 ECHR requires in the first place that any 
judgement concerning the determination of civil rights or of any criminal charge be given by 
an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. This right is often regarded as “one 
of the most important guarantees of the whole Convention”.92
As indicated above, this right is stricter in criminal – than in civil – cases. One consequence of 
this is that, whilst the ECtHR generally admits that the right to a fair trial is fully complied with 
in civil cases when effective access to a court is only exercised on appeal (meaning that the 
first determination of the right can be made by an administrative body and that the case is 
being heard on appeal by an impartial and independent tribunal having full jurisdiction), it will 
in principle not admit such two-tier jurisdictional review with regard to "criminal cases". This is 
due notably to the particular nature of criminal offences, on which the ECtHR has always 
been reluctant to compromise.
 
 
93
As it is put in the case law of the ECtHR, "[a]n 
 
 
oral, and public, hearing constitutes a 
fundamental principle enshrined in Article 6 § 1. This principle is particularly important in the 
criminal context, where generally there must be at first instance a tribunal which fully meets 
the requirements of Article 6 (…) and where the applicant has an entitlement to have its case 
“heard”, with the opportunity inter alia to give evidence in his own defence, hear the evidence 
against him and examine and cross-examine the witnesses."94 
 
The ECtHR has only ever admitted exceptions to this principle of first instance decision by a 
tribunal in narrow circumstances, essentially where the criminal charges under consideration 
are either minor or disciplinary in nature. 
 
Notwithstanding, discussions on this point often involve a cursory and general extension of 
the exception to all areas of criminal law except the "traditional" areas of criminal law, in other 
words, the exception becomes the rule. 
 
A more careful reading of the case law does not, however, allow such conclusions to be 
drawn. The general principle, as set out in the above quote, is that criminal charges must be 
heard at first instance by an independent and impartial tribunal and any derogation from this 
is exceptional and must be justified
B. The right to a first instance independent and impartial tribunal in criminal 
cases and the scope of exceptions 
. In light of their nature and the penalties involved, EC 
competition law proceedings cannot be considered as falling within such exceptions. The 
inevitable conclusion is that having such cases heard by the Commission at first instance is 
incompatible with Article 6 ECHR. These points are considered below. 
 
In the following part of this paper (part C), we will then consider the alternative view, i.e. that 
the exception can extend to EC competition law, and the consequences this has for the type 
of judicial review that is then required. And finally we will address a few other issues that may 
be problematic in the EC system viz Article 6 ECHR (part D). 
 
 
1. Introductory remarks 
 
                                                        
92 See S. TRECHSEL, Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings, Oxford University Press, 2005, at p. 46. 
93 See notably the De Cubber, Bendenoun, Öztürk, and Jussila judgments, all cited above. 
94 Jussila v. Finland, cited above, at para. 40 (emphasis added). 
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When considering arguments raised by parties alleging a violation of Article 6 ECHR by the 
Commission, the ECJ has summarily rejected those by considering that “the Commission 
cannot be considered as a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of Article 6 of the ECHR (…). The 
applicant’s argument that the decision is unlawful simply because it was adopted under a 
system in which the Commission carries out both investigatory and decision-making functions 
is therefore irrelevant.”95
 “depends therefore on the nature of the procedure concerned, rather than on whether 
it is in practice a ‘tribunal’ or an administrative body that investigates the case in 
question. In the case of procedures involving the determination of civil rights or any 
criminal charge, any party should be ‘entitled’ to be heard by an independent and 
impartial tribunal. Therefore, the mere fact that the Commission is not a ‘tribunal’ 
within the meaning of Article 6(1) should not mean as such that Article 6(1) is not 
applicable to the proceedings concerned.”
 
 
However, EC competition proceedings do not simply escape from Article 6 ECHR because a 
body that falls outside the notion of "tribunal" has been put in charge of them. In other words, 
the applicability of Article 6 ECHR: 
 
96
 “[a]lthough the Commission combines the investigative and prosecutorial with 
adjudicative functions, and thus cannot be qualified as an independent and impartial 
tribunal, this does not as such make the current system incompatible with Article 6 (1) 
ECHR. Indeed, 
 
 
How then can Article 6 ECHR be respected? In response to this, it is generally argued that: 
 
the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that, for reasons of 
efficiency, the determination of civil rights and obligations or the prosecution and 
punishment of offences which are “criminal” within the wider meaning of Article 6 
ECHR can be entrusted to administrative authorities, provided that the persons 
concerned are able to challenge any decision thus made before a judicial body that 
has full jurisdiction and that provides the full guarantees of Article 6(1) ECHR.”97
However, this does not reflect the case law of the ECtHR. Rather, the ECtHR states that "in 
the criminal context, […] 
 
 
In other words, according to the above, the fact that the Commission does not constitute an 
independent and impartial tribunal does not result in a violation of Article 6 ECHR, because its 
decisions are reviewed by the CFI and such a two-tiered procedural approach has been 
endorsed by the ECtHR. 
 
generally there must be at first instance a tribunal which fully meets 
the requirements of Article 6"98
In its famous judgment in Le Compte v. Belgium, the ECtHR held that “whilst Article 6 par. 1 
(…) embodies the “right to a court” (…), it nevertheless does not oblige the Contracting States 
to submit 
 and refusal of such access at first instance is therefore the 
exception. The key question is accordingly whether EC competition law is capable of falling 
within this exception, such that subsequent judicial review of Commission decisions imposing 
sanctions for breaches of Articles 81 and 82 EC by the CFI is sufficient to comply with the 
requirements of Article 6 (1) ECHR. We therefore consider in detail below the case law of the 
ECtHR on this point and whether EC competition law can be considered as falling within this 
exception. 
 
2. Requirement of an independent and impartial tribunal at first instance and its 
exceptions: case law of the ECtHR 
 
“contestations” (disputes) over “civil rights and obligations”
                                                        
95 See e.g. the judgments of the ECJ in joined cases 209-15 and 218/78, Heinz van Landewyck v. 
Commission (Fedetab), [1980] ECR 3125; or in joined cases 100-103/80, Musique diffusion française v. 
Commission (Pioneer), [1983] ECR 1825. 
96 D. WAELBROECK and D. FOSSELARD, cited above, p. 115. 
97 W. WILS, cited above, p. 209 (emphasis added). See also K. LENAERTS and J. VANHAMME, cited above, 
at pp. 555-556. 
98 Jussila v. Finland, cited above, at para. 40. 
 to a procedure 
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conducted at each of its stages before “tribunals” meeting the Article’s various requirements. 
Demands of flexibility and efficiency, which are fully compatible with the protection of human 
rights, may justify the prior intervention of administrative or professional bodies and, a fortiori, 
of judicial bodies which do not satisfy the said requirements in every respect (…).”99
In a subsequent case concerning disciplinary proceedings against Le Compte, a Belgian 
doctor, the ECtHR further held that “[i]n many member States of the Council of Europe, the 
duty of adjudicating on 
 
 
disciplinary offences is conferred on jurisdictional organs of 
professional associations. Even in instances where Article 6 para. 1 (…) is applicable, 
conferring powers in this manner does not in itself infringe the Convention (…). Nonetheless, 
in such circumstances the Convention calls at least for one of the two following systems: 
either the (administrative) organs themselves comply with the requirements of Article 6 (1) or 
they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full 
jurisdiction and does provide for the guarantees of Article 6 para. 1 (…).”100
In the Öztürk case, the ECtHR extended this line of case-law to certain criminal proceedings. 
However, the ECtHR also made very clear that, “[h]aving regard to the large number of 
 
 
minor 
offences, notably in the sphere of road traffic, a Contracting State may have good cause for 
relieving its courts of the task of their prosecution and punishment. Conferring the prosecution 
and punishment of minor offences on administrative authorities is not inconsistent with the 
Convention provided that the person concerned is enabled to take any decision thus made 
against him before a tribunal that does offer the guarantees of Article 6 (…).”101
Then, in Bendenoun v. France, a case concerning tax surcharges, the ECtHR held that “[a]s 
regards the general aspects of the French system of tax surcharges where the taxpayer has 
not acted in good faith, the Court considers that, 
 
 
having regard to the large number of 
offences of the kind referred to in Article 1729 para. 1 of the General Tax Code (…), 
Contracting States must be free to empower the Revenue to prosecute and punish them, 
even if the surcharges imposed as a penalty are large ones. Such a system is not 
incompatible with Article 6 (…) of the Convention so long as the taxpayer can bring any 
decision affecting him before a court that affords the safeguards of that provision.”102
It does however not follow from the Bendenoun judgment that the exception allowed for 
criminal cases in Öztürk applies not only to "minor offences" but to all criminal cases in 
general as soon as there would be a "large number of offences" to punish.
 
 
103
In this regard it should be recalled that the ECtHR has always insisted on the peculiar nature 
of criminal proceedings with regard to the application of Article 6 ECHR,
  
 
104 as well as on the 
restrictive interpretation to be given to the exceptions developed by case-law.105
                                                        
99 Judgment of the ECtHR of 23 June 1981 in the case of Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. 
Belgium, A 54, at para. 51 (emphasis added). On the basis of this le Compte case-law, the CFI found in 
Schneider (judgment of 11 July 2007, case T-351/03, at para. 183) that in merger cases, the fact that 
the decisional power was with the Commission and not a court was no breach of Article 6 ECHR. 
Merger cases are however not criminal law cases. 
100 Judgment of the ECtHR of 10 February 1983 in the case of Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium, series 
A 58, at para. 29 (emphasis added). 
101 Öztürk v. Germany, cited above, at para. 56 (emphasis added). 
102 Bendenoun v. France, cited above, at para. 46 (emphasis added). 
103 See for example W. WILS, “La compatibilité des procédures communautaires en matière de 
concurrence avec la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme”, cited above, at pp. 337-338. In 
subsequent articles, the author recognises however, that « [t]his alternative means [provided by the Le 
Compte case-law] of satisfying the requirements of Article 6(1) ECHR does not appear to be available in 
more traditional areas of criminal law or in areas considered criminal under domestic law (…). » (W. 
WILS, “The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in 
EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis”, cited above, at p. 209, fn. 13). The author 
seems to consider however that only prison sanctions “would require the transfer of the decisional 
power from the European Commission to the Community Courts.”  (idem, at p. 224, footnote 57). 
104 See e.g. Judgment of 9 March 2004, Pitkänen v. Finland, App. n° 30508/96, at para. 59. 
105 See for example the Judgement of 26 October 1984, De Cubber v. Belgium, Series A 86, at para. 32. 
 The 
guarantees provided by Article 6 (3) ECHR apply to all criminal law matters, and not only to 
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the hard core of criminal law such as imprisonment sanctions, as some authors have 
argued.106 It is clear from of the Court’s case-law that, as a general rule, criminal law 
proceedings should be heard at first instance by a tribunal respecting all the requirements of 
that provision. This interpretation is furthermore comforted by the text of Article 6 ECHR, 
which provides that “[i]n the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”107
The Bendenoun judgment was furthermore distinguished from "the hard core of criminal law" 
in the recent Grand Chamber case of Jussila v. Finland: "
  
 
[t]ax surcharges differ from the hard 
core of criminal law; consequently, the criminal-head guarantees will not necessarily apply 
with their full stringency (…)."108 Moreover, the ECtHR stated that "the Court is not convinced 
that removing procedural safeguards in the imposition of punitive penalties in [the fiscal] 
sphere is necessary to maintain the efficacy of the fiscal system or indeed can be regarded as 
consonant with the spirit and purpose of the Convention."109 The Court also firmly reaffirmed 
that "[a]n oral, and public, hearing constitutes a fundamental principle enshrined in Article 6 § 
1. This principle is particularly important in the criminal context, where generally there must be 
at first instance a tribunal which fully meets the requirements of Article 6 (…) and where the 
applicant has an entitlement to have its case “heard”, with the opportunity inter alia to give 
evidence in his own defence, hear the evidence against him and examine and cross-examine 
the witnesses."110
Also, in Findlay v. United Kingdom, concerning the trial of a military officer before a martial 
court, the ECtHR stated unequivocally that “[s]ince the applicant’s hearing was concerned 
with serious charges classified as “criminal” under both domestic and Convention law, he was 
entitled to a 
 
 
first instance tribunal which fully met the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (…).”111 
 
Thus, it appears that a first instance tribunal is necessary in criminal cases in order to comply 
with Article 6 ECHR. This is a legal obligation from which it may only be derogated in 
exceptional circumstances in criminal proceedings, i.e. when "minor offences" (such as traffic 
offences or tax surcharges) are at stake
                                                        
106 See footnote 
. This exception may be explained by the fact that in 
particular because in such minor cases, either the judge's review of the case will not be 
compromised or coloured by the pre-existence of an administration decision or the risk of 
such compromise is worth taking in light of certain factors (less serious nature of the offence, 
the great volume of cases, etc.) 
 
In the case of minor offences indeed the procedural defects of the administrative stage are 
outweighed by the benefits gained from the efficiency of the whole system (e.g. the economy 
of procedural costs, the expediency of the procedure, the possibility for the administrative 
authority to concentrate its scarce resources on more serious cases, etc.) combined with the 
possibility to have these procedural defects redressed on appeal in any case. However, in 
normal criminal cases, the rights of the defence outweigh these marginal advantages.  
 
As will be shown below, the requirements of independence and impartiality are indeed not 
purely formalistic but lay at the heart of the principle of due process. For reasons of judicial 
efficiency or economy, only exceptionally may the requirement that the sanction is imposed 
by a tribunal be derogated from and only provided that there is a possibility for judicial review 
against the decision taken.  
 
103 above. 
107 Emphasis added. We insist on the language used “in the determination…” and not “in the final 
determination…”. No need to recall that according to Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
law of treaties, the first method of interpretation is to be based on the text and the wording of the treaty 
provision to be interpreted. 
108 Jussila v. Finland, cited above, at para. 43. (emphasis added) 
109 Jussila v. Finland, cited above, at para. 36. 
110 Jussila v. Finland, cited above, at para. 40 (emphasis added). 
111 Judgment of 25 February 1997, Findlay v. United Kingdom, reports 1997-I, at para. 79. 
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Or as stated by three members of the Human Rights Commission "where criminal justice, as 
is often the case, is administered at two levels – at first instance and on appeal – it is not 
sufficient that the requirement of impartiality is satisfied at the appeal stage. While various 
minor procedural deficiencies may well be remedied in appeal proceedings, the requirement 
of an impartial tribunal is of such a fundamental character that it should be satisfied already 
during the trial at first instance, this being in general an essential – and perhaps even the 
most important – part of the criminal proceedings against an accused person, in particular 
where – as would seem to have been the situation in the present case – the evidence in the 
case was not heard again by the court of appeal."112
The distinction drawn by the ECtHR between "minor offences" and other violations forming 
part of the "core of criminal law" can be traced back to the Öztürk  judgment in 1984.
  
 
3. Competition law infringements leading to sanctions cannot be regarded anymore 
as "minor offences" 
 
113
First, the amount of the fines imposed by the Commission for violations of Article 81 or 82 of 
the EC Treaty has risen dramatically over the last 15 years. For example, whilst fines 
imposed by the Commission in the late 1970s were of the order of several tens of thousands 
of EUR, the maximum fine imposed for a cartel infringement in 2007 of 992 million EUR in the 
Elevators and Escalators case.
 
However, as shown above, the ECtHR has only applied this line of case-law so far to minor 
traffic offences and tax surcharges or still to disciplinary offences where criminal sanctions 
were small. In fact, as the ECtHR explained in Jussila, this distinction is linked to the 
progressive stretching out of the notion of "criminal sanction" under the ECHR following the 
application of the Engel and others criteria: it would simply have been very difficult to require 
Member States to comply with all the requirements of Article 6 in areas such as traffic 
offences and tax surcharges, where hundreds of thousands of minor violations take place 
every year.  
 
The same cannot be said about Community antitrust proceedings, not only because they are 
less numerous, but also because a number of factors indeed indicate that competition law 
proceedings can no longer qualify under the "minor offences" exception allowed under ECtHR 
case-law. 
 
114 This increase seems even to have accelerated in the last 
two or three years.115
                                                        
112 Dissenting Opinion of Mr H. Danelius, Mrs. G. H. Thune and Mr. L. Loucaides in the Report of the 
Human Rights Commission of 2 March 1995 in case Thomann v. Switzerland, App. n° 17602/91. It has 
to be observed that in this case the majority did not disagree with this finding of the minority but merely 
held that in casu, there was no lack of impartiality at the appeal stage. The mere fact that the accused 
had first been judged in his absence by the same judges that subsequently judged him on appeal did 
not reveal any lack of impartiality The Human Rights Commission recalled however (at para. 65) that 
impartiality was required already at first instance. A problem might occur for instance“where a trial judge 
had previously held in the public prosecutor’s department an office whose nature was such that he may 
have had to deal with the case (…), or exercised the functions of an investigating judge with extensive 
powers and particularly detailed knowledge of the files (…), or taken pre-trial decisions on the basis of 
legal provisions requiring a particularly confirmed suspicion (…).”  
113 Cited above. 
114 Commission Decision of 21st February 2007, case COMP/E-1/38.823, no public version yet available. 
115 The latest fine imposed by the Commission has raised the total amount of fines imposed by the 
Commission in antitrust cases to more than 3 billion EUR in 2007. The total fines of 486 million EUR 
which were imposed in the recent Flat Glass case were imposed for cartel activities lasting less than a 
year. This makes some lawyers suggest that, on the basis of the Commission’s new Fining Guidelines, 
allowing for amounts of fines reaching the 30% turnover, fines beyond 1 billion EUR could become the 
new benchmark (in Financial Times of 29 November 2007, "Flat Glass groups are fined 500 million 
EUR"). 
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Second, violations of competition law have been criminalised in a growing number of Member 
States.116
Thirdly, as indicated, the stigma attached to violations of competition rules has increased 
dramatically, cartels being prohibited in stronger terms than ever.
  
 
 117
The current institutional system before the Commission is not only problematic because it 
goes against the requirements of the ECtHR. It is also problematic because the accumulation 
of investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative powers by the Commission during the whole 
proceedings in antitrust cases leads naturally to what is called "prosecutorial bias", i.e. the 
fact that a case handler will naturally tend to have a bias in favour of finding a violation once 
proceedings have been commenced. The case-handler's position is in this regard not different 
from the position of a defence lawyer who naturally develops a bias in favour of his client. 
Applied to the Commission in competition proceedings, this however means that the 
Commission will be naturally more inclined to find the existence of a breach of Articles 81 and 
82 EC and to take a decision imposing sanctions than if this decision was taken by an 
 
 
The progressive evolution of the Commission’s fining policy with regard to competition law 
infringements, considered together with the clarification of Article 6 ECHR by the ECtHR, 
make it obvious today that the current Community system in antitrust proceedings is not in 
line anymore with the fundamental right to a fair trial. Indeed, while the Commission is 
"determining" at first instance "the existence of a criminal charge" (in the sense of Article 6 
ECHR), it is not complying with the substantive requirements imposed by this provision.  
 
It can therefore only be concluded that competition law infringements leading to sanctions 
cannot be regarded anymore as "minor offences", and that there is therefore a requirement of 
an independent and impartial tribunal already at first instance. 
 
4.  The conjunction of investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative powers by  the 
Commission and the problem of prosecutorial bias 
 
                                                        
116 In accordance with Article 5 of Regulation n° 1/2003, a total of 17 Member States have taken laws 
imposing criminal sanctions on companies and/or on individuals for breaches of competition law in their 
jurisdiction (UK, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, Ireland, Austria, Greece, Spain, Estonia, Slovak 
Republic, Czech Republic, Finland, Norway, Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia) with sanctions ranging from 
criminal fines to imprisonment or disqualification of company directors. Not to speak about the possibility 
for national criminal sanctions in the hypothesis of a refusal to cooperate with the Commission when it is 
exercising its powers of investigation, including during a dawn raid for example (see notably, with regard 
to the UK, the Judgment of 17 September 2007 in joined cases T-125/03 and T-253/03, Akzo and 
Akcros v. Commission, not yet published, at para. 63). 
117 See above Section I.B.1(ii). 
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independent and impartial tribunal which played no role whatsoever during the investigation of 
the case. In good "Hegelian dialectics", a sound system would however require "thesis", 
"antithesis" and "synthesis" by three different actors. A "Salomon" with an open mind should 
listen to both parties and then decide the case.118
The existence of a "prosecutorial bias" is generally explained by the following set of factors:
 
 
 
119
• First, there is a natural tendency for persons investigating on a case to search for 
evidence which confirms rather than challenges one’s beliefs, and to accept more 
readily the conclusion to a syllogism if it corresponds to one’s belief than if it does not, 
irrespective of its actual logical validity (a so-called "confirmation bias"). Such a 
confirmation bias certainly exists in proceedings relating to the application of Articles 
81 and 82 EC, because the Commission will normally only start an investigation if the 
officials of DG Competition hold the initial belief that an infringement is to be found.  
 
 
 
• Secondly, there is what psychologists call hindsight bias or the desire to justify past 
efforts. As one author has put it “it is understandable in human terms that 
Commission officials sometimes want to push through what they perceive to be ‘their’ 
case. And it explains why arguments put forward by the parties often appear to fall on 
deaf ears.”120
 
 This may be simply explained by the fact that person will naturally 
refrain from coming to conclusions that put into question the validity of their past 
conclusions. An official of DG Competition for example will be reluctant, after having 
pushed a case through and issued a statement of objections, to consider later in its 
investigations that the case for the finding of an infringement was weaker than he had 
initially thought. This may be explained not only by internal psychological factors but 
also by the need to justify past decision to hierarchical superiors or to outside 
observers.  
• Thirdly, there is the desire to show a high level of enforcement activity. This aim has 
also been actively pursued by the Commission in competition matters, as exemplified 
by the statistics published on its website121 and by numerous speeches of 
Competition Commissioners insisting on the number of decisions imposing fines and 
on the high level of these fines.122 While this may be a legitimate means to ensure 
deterrence, there is obviously also “a potential risk of abuse, in that dubious cases 
might be pursued or fines might be inflated in order to keep up the statistics.” 123
 
 
                                                        
118 Although the ECtHR has never had to decide on this question with regard to the EC, for obvious 
reasons of competence, it appears that this absence of formal separation at EC level between 
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions would very likely be problematic under Article 6 ECHR. 
Interestingly, at national level, the French Cour de Cassation has already decided in a judgment of 5 
October 1999, TGV Nord et Pont de Normandie, that the participation of the rapporteur in the 
deliberations of the Conseil de la Concurrence, to the extent that he has undertaken investigations 
during the fact-finding process, was contrary to Article 6(1) ECHR. For a more detailed discussion on 
this judgment, see D. WAELBROECK and M. GRIFFITHS, “French Cour de Cassation: T.G.V. Nord et Pont 
de Normandie, Judgment of 5 October 1999”, case note in 37 CMLR (2000), pp. 1465-1476. 
119 We are indebted here to W. WILS and his article on “The Combination of the Investigative and 
Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis”, cited above, pp. 212-220.  
120 F. MONTAG, “The Case for a Radical Reform of the Infringement Procedure under Regulation 17” 
[1996] 8 ECLR 428-437, at p. 430. 
121 See the Commission’s webpage http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf. 
122 See notably the Speech of Neelie Kroes of 26 June 2007 (Speech 07/425, available on the 
Commission’s website), where Ms. Kroes stated that “[s]o far this year we have adopted three cartel 
decisions with fines totalling more than 2 billion euros. And I expect to bring several more investigations 
to an end later this year.” 
123 W. WILS, “The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative 
Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis”, cited above, p. 217. In addition, 
fines have become an important resource for the Community (with a total budget of 126.5 billion € in 
2007, fines totalling more than 2 billion € constitute between 1% and 2% of this total budget). 
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A prosecutorial bias does however not arise in a system in which the competition enforcement 
authorities prosecute before an independent court, as it is the case in a large number of 
countries in the world.124 Such a system does not only provide for better procedural 
safeguards against partiality and prosecutorial bias, but enjoys higher legitimacy for those 
undertakings on which sanctions are imposed, with the result that there is a higher degree of 
acceptance of the decision and that fewer appeals are being brought before superior 
courts.125
The current "prosecutorial bias" is only partly remedied by the recent introduction of "peer 
review panels" composed of experienced officials in order to scrutinise the case team’s 
conclusions with a "fresh pair of eyes". Indeed, if the peer review normally takes place before 
the sending of a statement of objections, in all cases applying Article 82 EC, it only applies to 
cases applying Article 81 EC "where appropriate" and in principle not in cartel cases.
 
 
126 
Second, this system is by no means equivalent to having an independent administrative law 
judge taking a decision following a full trial in which both sides of the case are present. Third 
and in any event, the Commissioners are not "walled-off" from discussion of the matter with 
the staff investigating the case while the case is under adjudication.127 Fourth, it is also 
questionable whether such a duplication of tasks simply results in more lengthy and costly 
proceedings,128 with the decision-taking phase of the administrative proceedings becoming “a 
superfluous anticipation of the work which will be done anyway by the reviewing judge”.129
Finally, the most insidious and intractable problem with this accumulation of powers by the 
administrative authority is that its impact on the outcome of a decision is impossible to 
measure. As the ECtHR stated in Tsfayo, “[o]ne of the essential problems which flows from 
the connection between a tribunal determining facts and a party to the dispute is that the 
extent to which a judgment of fact may be infected cannot easily be, if at all, discerned. The 
influence of the connection may not be apparent from the terms of the decision which sets out 
the primary facts and the inferences drawn from those facts. (...) Thus it is no answer to a 
charge of bias to look at the terms of a decision and to say that no actual bias is 
demonstrated or that the reasoning is clear, cogent and supported by the evidence.”
  
 
130
The fact that prosecutorial bias has a definite but immeasurable impact on the outcome of 
decisions is probably a further reason why decisions in criminal cases should in our view 
always be taken at first instance by a tribunal respecting all the requirements of Article 6 
 
 
                                                        
124 Such as Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia and Norway for example. In the 27 EU Member States, 
practice is much more contrasted, with 14 countries (namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia) still allowing for sanctions to be taken by the investigating authorities, subject to 
subsequent judicial review by an independent court, while in the 13 others (namely Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom) these sanctions – which are often considered as having a criminal character – may only be 
imposed by an independent body or court (within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR), with the investigating 
authority playing the role of a prosecutor before it. This classification may be subject to some changes, 
depending on the definition of a court in every single case and to internal reforms.  
125 In this regard, see F. MONTAG, cited above, at p. 429: “Undertakings often feel that they are treated 
unfairly and that their procedural rights are violated in the course of infringement proceedings. (…) 
[B]ecause undertakings are uncomfortable with the way in which infringement proceedings are carried 
out and decisions are reached, Commission decisions imposing significant fines lack acceptance.” 
126 See W. WILS, cited above, at p. 203. 
127 On the contrary, under Commission proceedings, the College of Commissioners (who is taking the 
final decision on the case by simple majority) only receives a proposal from the Competition 
Commissioner, who has himself or herself been briefed by the DG Competition officials dealing with the 
case, including the Chief Competition Economist and the review panel if they have been involved in the 
case, as well as by the Hearing Officer and possibly other Commission officials.  See W. WILS, “The 
Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC 
Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and Economic Analysis”, cited above, pp. 203 and 207. 
128 Administrative cost being traditionally the main argument invoked to support the maintenance of the 
current system in comparison with a system based on prosecution before the Community Courts. 
129 W. WILS, cited above, p. 222. 
130 Judgment of the ECtHR of 14 November 2006, Tsfayo v. United Kingdom, App. n° 60860/00, at para. 
33. 
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ECHR. Unlike cases under the civil head of Article 6 (and exceptionally minor criminal 
offences), the risk that prosecutorial bias will not be corrected by subsequent judicial review is 
simply unacceptable in criminal cases. This is why the ECtHR excludes as a matter of 
principle that, except in exceptional cases, criminal sanctions are imposed at first instance by 
an administrative body. 
 
5. The right to a hearing that is public 
 
Oral hearings present companies accused of violating competition law with a last chance to 
defend themselves before the Commission rules on their case. Such hearings –which are 
also attended by officials from the EU Member-States– are always held behind close doors 
largely to shield the companies involved and guard against the release of sensitive business 
secrets. Even when parties waived their right to a confidential hearing to ensure a full and fair 
examination of the issues and urged the Commission to hold a public hearing this has been 
denied. Indeed, the Commission found that in such a case "presentation from the various 
parties would play to the gallery rather than throw light on the issues at stake in the case."131
According to the ECtHR, "[a]n 
 
Needless to say, this is a strange argument as public hearings before courts have on the 
contrary always been regarded as an essential guarantee of the fairness and openness of 
debate. 
 
oral, and public hearing constitutes a fundamental principle 
enshrined in Article 6, §1."132
According to the ECJ, “[a]s the purpose of the procedure before the Commission is to apply 
Article [81] of the Treaty even where it may lead to the imposition of fines, it is an 
administrative procedure. Within the context of such a procedure there is nothing to prevent 
the Members of the Commission who are responsible for taking a decision imposing fines 
from being informed of the outcome of the hearing by such persons as the Commission has 
appointed to conduct it […]. Thus
 
 
6. The right to an oral hearing before the person deciding the case 
 
A further difficulty with the current proceedings in EU competition cases is that the persons 
actually adjudicating the cases are not present at the hearing.  
 
, the fact that the applicant was not heard personally by the 
members of the Commission at its hearing cannot amount to a defect in the contested 
decision.”133
The ECtHR has recently recalled that the right to “[a]n oral, and public, hearing constitutes a 
fundamental principle enshrined in Article 6 § 1. 
 Again, one may wonder if such reasoning would still be valid today. 
 
This principle is particularly important in the 
criminal context, where generally there must be at first instance a tribunal which fully meets 
the requirements of Article 6 (…) and where the applicant has an entitlement to have its case 
“heard”, with the opportunity inter alia to give evidence in his own defence, hear the evidence 
against him and examine and cross-examine the witnesses.”134
"[A]lthough earlier cases emphasised that a hearing must be held before a court of first and 
only instance unless there were exceptional circumstances that justifies dispensing one (…), 
 
 
                                                        
131 See e.g. Microsoft's requests reported in F.T. 14 March 2006. 
132 Judgments of the ECtHR of 23 February 1994, Fredin (n° 2), Series A283-A, para. 21; of 26 April 
1995, Fischer, Series A312, para. 44; Jussila v. Finland, supra note 20, at para. 40 (emphasis added). 
See also the statement of Robert Badinter in Le Monde of 27.1.2004 concerning the project of direct 
settlement procedure in France: “Le coeur de la procédure pénale, c’est l’audience. C’est le lieu où l’on 
décide de la valeur des preuves, de la culpabilité, enfin de la peine et de la réparation due à la victime. 
A l’audience, le procureur n’est pas une partie privilégiée. Le débat est public. Depuis la Révolution, 
cette publicité est une garantie pour le prévenu et pour le peuple que la justice n’est ni confisquée, ni 
manipulée.  
133 Judgment of the ECJ of 15 July 1970 in Case 45/69, Boehringer Mannheim v. Commission [1970] 
ECR p. 769, at para. 23.  
134 Jussila v. Finland, cited above, at para. 40 (emphasis added). See also the judgments of the ECtHR 
of 23 February 1994, Fredin (N° 2), Series A 283 A at para. 21, and of 26 April 1995, Fischer, Series A 
312, at para. 44. 
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the Court has clarified that the character of the circumstances that may justify dispensing with 
an oral hearing essentially comes down to the nature of the issues to be decided by the 
competent national court, not to the frequency of such situations. It does not mean that 
refusing to hold an oral hearing may be justified only in rare cases (…). The overarching 
principle of fairness embodied in Article 6 is, as always, the key consideration (…)."135
The ECtHR insisted in this regard in particular on the fact that “the requirements of a fair 
hearing are the most strict in the sphere of criminal law.”
 
 
136 Dispensing with an oral hearing 
would not be acceptable in areas forming “the hard core of criminal law”,137
In this regard, as stated by the OECD, "[n]o other jurisdiction in the OECD assigns decision–
making responsibility in competition enforcement to a body like the Commission" as indeed 
"[w]ith 25 members, the Commission is too large to effectively deliberate and decide fact-
intensive matters."
 and then probably 
only for minor and/or mere disciplinary offences.   
 
As will be explained in more detail below, proceedings before the Commission in competition 
cases are led by a team of Commission officials investigating the case. Parties have the right 
to express their views orally during these proceedings before a Hearing Officer, who will 
subsequently report to the Competition Commissioner on the content of this hearing. Finally, 
the Commissioner in charge of competition brings the case before the full College of 
Commissioners, who –although it did not attend the hearing– takes a final decision.  
 
It should be recalled at this stage that the right to be heard means that no decision may be 
taken against a person unless that person was previously given an opportunity to state his or 
her position on the issue. 
 
A proper hearing is not only necessary to ensure greater acceptance of the decision, but 
allows opposing positions to be directly confronted and challenged, including the possibility 
for cross-examination and interactive exchanges. Obviously, this requires the presence at oral 
proceedings of the persons who are ultimately deciding the case. 
 
138 In most EU Member States, hearings in competition law proceedings 
take place before the persons (whether it is an independent judge or an administrative 
authority) responsible for taking the final decision (see table below). On the contrary, in the 
EU, "when the Commission decides a matter, it has typically not heard directly the case 
against the proposed decision", and "[n]o Commissioner, including even the competition 
Commissioner, will have attended the hearing."139 Indeed, "[a]ll depends on briefings from 
staff and there is no ex parte rule or other control on contacts between investigating staff and 
the Commissioners who decide the matter."140
Member State 
 
 
 
Body responsible for taking a 
decision imposing sanctions for 
competition law infringements 
Right to an oral hearing 
before the members of this 
body who are ultimately 
taking the decision? 
Austria Cartel Court Yes 
Belgium Competition Council Yes 
                                                        
135 Jussila v. Finland, cited above, at para. 42 (emphasis added). 
136 Idem, at para. 43. Furthermore, in its partly dissenting opinion in the same case, Judge Loucaides, 
joined by Judges Zupančič and Spielmann, argued that “[t]he requirement of a public hearing in judicial 
proceedings has been challenged during the drafting of certain international instruments, but even 
where this challenge has been successful, as in the case of the American Convention on Human Rights, 
the guarantee of a public hearing has been retained in respect of criminal proceedings. It appears from 
the Court’s case-law that whenever the Court has found that a hearing could be dispensed with in 
respect of criminal proceedings at the appeal stage, it was always made clear that a hearing should 
have taken place at first instance (…).” 
137 Ibidem. 
138 Report quoted above, at p. 63. 
139 Ibidem, p. 64. 
140 Ibidem. 
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Bulgaria Commission for the Protection of 
Competition 
Yes 
Cyprus Commission for the Protection of 
Competition 
Yes 
Czech Republic Office for the Protection of 
Competition 
Yes (if necessary) 
Denmark Criminal Court Yes 
Estonia Criminal Court Yes 
Finland Market Court Yes 
France  Competition Council Yes 
Germany Competition Authority Yes 
Greece Competition Commission Yes (but not always before all 
of them) 
Hungary Competition Council Yes (but only in important 
cases) 
Ireland  Court Yes  
Italy Competition Authority Yes 
Latvia Competition Council Yes 
Lithuania Competition Council Yes 
Luxembourg Competition Council Yes 
Malta Court Yes 
the Netherlands Director General of the Competition 
Authority 
Yes 
Poland President of the Competition Office No 
Portugal Competition Council No 
Romania President of the Competition Council Yes 
Slovakia Antimonopoly office Yes  
Slovenia Competition Authority Yes (but not always) 
Spain Competition Court Yes (upon request) 
Sweden Court of First Instance Yes (upon request) 
United Kingdom Office for Fair Trading  No 
European Union European Commission (College of 
Commissioners) 
No 
 
The same is true for the major jurisdictions outside the EU.  
 
Country Body responsible for taking a 
decision imposing sanctions for 
competition law infringements 
Right to an oral hearing 
before the members of this 
body who are ultimately 
taking the decision? 
Australia Court Yes 
Canada Court Yes 
Japan Court Yes 
South Korea Court Yes 
Norway Criminal Court Yes 
United States  Federal District Court Yes 
 
Thus, even in countries where there is no strict separation between investigatory, 
prosecutorial and adjudicative powers at the administrative stage (as it is the case in the EU), 
parties are generally given the opportunity to present their views to those members of the 
administrative body who will ultimately be taking the decision imposing sanctions. The fact 
that no such guarantee exists under the Community system constitutes further evidence of 
the fact, not only that Article 6 ECHR is not complied with,141
                                                        
141 See above. 
 but also that the general 
requirements of fairness embodied in that provision are not being given enough attention.  
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C. If criminal sanctions are not imposed at first instance by an independent 
and impartial tribunal, they should at the very least be subject to fuller 
judicial review as required under Article 6 ECHR 
 
1. The requirement under Article 6 ECHR for full jurisdictional review 
 
In Le Compte,142 the ECtHR stated that “the Convention calls at least for one of the following 
systems: either the jurisdictional organs themselves comply with the requirements of Article 6, 
paragraph 1, or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent control by a judicial body 
that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6, paragraph 1.” As shown 
above, this possibility only extends to civil and disciplinary proceedings, but is not allowed in 
criminal law matters (except for minor offences).143 Such a system would thus only be 
acceptable with regard to antitrust cases if it were to be admitted that antitrust violations 
constitute "minor offences" such as traffic offences or tax surcharges in the light of Article 6 
ECHR.144
The main question is therefore what is meant by "full judicial review". Does it suffice to have a 
mere control of legality, as currently exercised by the CFI and the ECJ in antitrust matters, or 
is it necessary to have a complete de novo review, implying the possibility for the judge to 
remake entirely the whole decision?
 
 
In our view, and as indicated, criminal sanctions such as those imposed by the Commission 
for antitrust violations are not "minor offences" and can only be imposed at first instance by an 
independent and impartial tribunal. However, even if it were to be considered that antitrust 
violations benefit from the "minor offences" exception –quod certe non– the question is then 
whether the current standard of review exercised by the Community courts in antitrust cases 
does amount to a "full judicial review" as required under Article 6 ECHR. 
 
145
In this regard, it is clear that a different standard of review applies with regard to civil cases 
than in criminal cases.
  
 
146 With respect to decisions concerning the "determination of civil 
rights and obligations", the ECtHR has stated that in specialised areas of an administrative 
nature, it is sufficient for the court of review to exercise a restricted jurisdiction and to leave 
the determination of primary facts to the administrative body, “particularly where the facts 
have already been established in the course of a quasi-judicial procedure governed by many 
of the safeguards required by Article 6 para. 1 (…)”.147 In these cases "it is generally inherent 
in the notion of judicial review that, if a ground of challenge is upheld, the reviewing court has 
power to quash the impugned decision, and that either the decision will then be taken by the 
review court, or the case will be remitted for a fresh decision by the same or a different 
body".148 However, when the determination of the facts lies at the heart of the judicial 
proceedings and of the applicants’ contestation, the ECtHR requires that the review Court 
must have the power to rehear the evidence or to substitute its own views to that of the 
administrative authority. Otherwise, there would be a risk that “there was never the possibility 
that the central issue would be determined by a tribunal that was independent of one of the 
parties to the dispute”.149
                                                        
142 Cited above, at fn.
  
100. The CFI has referred to this judgment to justify the fact that merger decisions 
are taken by an administrative authority in Case T-351/03, Schneider Electric SA v. Commission, 11 
July 2007, para. 183. However, merger decisions, contrary to decision imposing fines are clearly not of a 
"criminal nature". 
143 See the developments above. See also the judgment of the ECtHR of 26 October 1984, De Cubber 
v. Belgium, cited above, at para. 32. 
144 See notbaly the Öztürk judgment and the developments above. 
145 For a more in-depth analysis of the notion of “tribunal having full jurisdiction”, see D. WAELBROECK 
and D. FOSSELARD, cited above, at pp. 127-133. 
146 See also A. ADREANGELI, cited above at footnote 11. 
147 Judgment of the ECtHR of 22 November 1995, Bryan v. United Kingdom, Series A 335-A, at para. 
47. See also the judgments of 18 January 2001, Chapman v. U. K., App. n° 27238/95 and Jane Smith v. 
U.K., App. n° 25154/94. 
148 Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 28 May 2002, Kingsley v. U.K., App. n° 35605/97, at para. 58. See 
also the judgment of 31 May 2007, Bistrovic v. Croatia, App. n° 25774/05. 
149 Judgment of 14 November 2006, Tsfayo v. U.K., App. n° 60860/00, at para. 48. 
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In cases concerning the "determination of a criminal charge" however, the ECtHR takes a 
stricter approach, requiring that the appeal jurisdiction does not only verify the correct 
application of the law by the administrative authority but is also able to engage in a complete 
reassessment of the facts and of the evidence produced before it ("de novo review"). In that 
regard, the ECtHR has also consistently stated that “the right to a court and the right to a 
judicial determination of the dispute cover question of fact as much as questions of law.”150
Thus, in Schmautzer, a case concerning an Austrian citizen who was imposed a fine (with 
twenty-four hours’ imprisonment in default of payment) for not wearing his safety belt while 
driving his car, the ECtHR considered that “the powers of the Administrative Court must be 
assessed in the light of the fact that the court in this case was sitting in proceedings that were 
of a criminal nature for the purposes of the Convention.”
 
 
151 The ECtHR went on to observe 
that “when the compatibility of those powers with Article 6 para. 1 (…) is being gauged, regard 
must be had to the complaints raised in that court by the applicant as well as to the defining 
characteristics of a “judicial body that has full jurisdiction”. These include the power to quash 
in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the decision of the body below.”152
“According to the Court’s case-law, it is possible for a higher tribunal, in certain 
circumstances, to make reparation for an initial violation of the Convention (see the De 
Cubber v. Belgium judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 86, p. 19, § 33). However, in 
the present case, the Court observes that the Supreme Court agreed with the approach of the 
first instance court, i.e. that the latter could itself try a case of criminal contempt committed in 
its face, and rejected the applicant’s complaints which are now before this Court. There was 
no retrial of the case by the Supreme Court. As a court of appeal, 
 As the 
Administrative Court lacked that power in this case, the ECtHR considered that it could not be 
regarded as a "tribunal" within the meaning of the Convention and that there had been a 
violation of Article 6 ECHR. 
 
More clearly still in Kyprianou, concerning a contempt of Court before the Cypriot jurisdiction 
falling under the criminal heading of Article 6 ECHR, the ECtHR held the following: 
the Supreme Court did not 
have full competence to deal de novo with the case, but could only review the first instance 
judgment for possible legal or manifest factual errors. It did not carry out an ab initio, 
independent determination of the criminal charge against the applicant for contempt of the 
Assize Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that it could not interfere with the 
judgment of the Assize Court, accepting that that court had a margin of appreciation in 
imposing a sentence on the applicant. Indeed, although the Supreme Court had the power to 
quash the impugned decision on the ground that the composition of the Assize Court had not 
been such as to guarantee its impartiality, it declined to do so. The Court also notes that the 
appeal did not have a suspensive effect on the judgment of the Assize Court. In this 
connection, it observes that the applicant’s conviction and sentence became effective under 
domestic criminal procedure on the same day as the delivery of the judgment by the Assize 
Court, i.e. on 14 February 2001. (…) In these circumstances, the Court is not convinced by 
the Government’s argument that any defect in the proceedings of the Assize Court was cured 
on appeal by the Supreme Court.” 153
                                                        
150 Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, cited above, at para. 51. 
151 Judgment of 23 October 1995, Schmautzer v. Austria, Series A328-A, at para. 36. 
152 Ibidem. See also the judgment (Plenary Chamber) of 29 April 1988, Belilos v. Switzerland, Series A 
132,at paras. 69-70. 
153 Judgment of 27 January 2004, Kyprianou v. Cyprus, App. n° 73797/01, at paras. 43-46 (emphasis 
added). This judgment was subsequently upheld by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, who delivered its 
judgment in the same case on 15 December 2005. See also the judgment of 26 April 1995, Fischer v. 
Austria, Series A 312. 
 
It follows from the above that the requirements of the ECHR are extremely strict and require 
effectively a full de novo review of the case. 
 
2.  The standard of review applied by the ECJ and CFI 
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This strict approach has to be contrasted to that of the Community courts which take a fairly 
conservative approach as to their own competence. For instance, the Community courts 
generally take the view that "(…) the review carried out by the Court of the complex economic 
assessments undertaken by the Commission in the exercise of the discretion conferred on it 
by Article [81(3)] of the Treaty in relation to each of the four conditions laid down therein, must 
be limited to ascertaining whether the procedural rules have been complied with, whether 
proper reasons have been provided, whether the facts have been accurately stated and 
whether there has been any manifest error of appraisals or misuse of powers (…) It is not for 
the Court of First Instance to substitute its own assessment for that of the Commission."154
The same reasoning is also applied in Article 82 cases, in which complex economic 
assessments are even more often at stake. In the recent Wanadoo judgment for example, the 
CFI held that, “as the choice of method of calculation as to the rate of recovery of costs 
entails a complex economic assessment on the part of the Commission, the Commission 
must be afforded a broad discretion (…). The Court’s review must therefore be limited to 
verifying whether the relevant rules on procedure and on the statement of reasons have been 
complied with, whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been 
any manifest error of appraisal or a misuse of powers.”
 
 
155
The same reasoning can be found in most judgments, such as most recently in the Microsoft 
case or in the Deutsche Telekom case.
 
 
156 In this regard, it should also secondly be recalled 
that Articles 229 and 230 of the EC treaty only confer unlimited jurisdiction on the Community 
courts with regard to the determination of pecuniary sanctions.157 As one of its former 
members has stated, the CFI is, “essentially, a review court. That is to say its function is not 
to rehear the case or to substitute its own opinion for that of the Commission, but to review 
the legality of what the Commission has decided.”158
In the light of ECtHR case-law, it is clear that judicial review by the CFI in antitrust cases 
should not be limited to questions of law and to the determination of the appropriate level of 
the fine, but should also extend to a full reassessment of the facts and to the expediency of 
the Commission’s decision. The CFI cannot limit its analysis to “manifest errors of appraisals 
or misuses of power” but should in every case reassess fully the facts and the choice of the 
appropriate legal and economic tests applied to these facts. The "unlimited jurisdiction" that 
the Community Courts are entitled to exercise should not be limited to altering the amount of 
the fines imposed on companies but should also extend to the very determination of the 
infringement giving rise to these sanctions.
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
159
                                                        
154 See for example case T-17/93, Matra Hachette v. Commission, [1994] ECR II-595-656, at para. 104. 
(emphasis added). See further case 42/84, Remia, [1985] ECR 2545, para. 34, joined cases 142/84 and 
156/84, BAT and Reynolds, [1987] ECR 4487, at para; 62, case C-194/99 P, Thyssen Stahl, [2003] ECR 
I-10821, at para. 78. See also the case-law cited above. 
155 See the recent CFI Judgment in case T-340/03, France Télécom v. Commission (Wanadoo), at 
para. 129.  
156 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission, at para. 87: “The Court observes that it follows from 
consistent case-law that, although as a general rule the Community Courts undertake a comprehensive 
review of the question as to whether or not the conditions for the application of the competition rules are 
met, their review of complex economic appraisals made by the Commission is necessarily limited to 
checking whether the relevant rules on procedure and on stating reasons have been complied with, 
whether the facts have been accurately stated and whether there has been any manifest error of 
assessment or a misuse of powers.” 
157 See the recent CFI Judgment in Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Commission, at para. 185 
which repeats the same statement. See K. LENAERTS, I. MASELIS and D. ARTS, Procedural Law of the 
European Union, Robert Bray (ed.), Thomson, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2006, pp. 447-451. 
158 Judge D. BARRINGTON, cited in D. WAELBROECK and D. FOSSELARD, cited above, at p. 132.  
159 See also D. WAELBROECK and D. FOSSELARD, cited above, at pp. 127-133. 
 Indeed, the progressive change of nature of 
antitrust proceedings and of the sanctions are imposed in such proceedings now require "full 
judicial review", as it is understood by the ECtHR, in these cases. 
 
 
 35 
 
D. Other issues that are problematic in the EC system viz Article 6 ECHR 
 
In this regard, two other features of the current system of judicial review appear problematic in 
the light of ECtHR case-law. 
 
The first issue is the absence of suspensory effect for proceedings brought before the 
Community Courts.160 As shown for instance in the quotation from the Kyprianou judgment 
hereabove, a proper system of full jurisdictional review by an independent tribunal requires 
automatic suspensory effect. However, under the EU competition system, even if there is the 
theoretical possibility for companies to request a suspension of the application of the 
Commission’s decision, such a request will almost invariably be rejected in practice, due to 
the extremely strict conditions that have been developed by the Community courts in their 
case-law.161 As a result, companies have no choice but to comply with a Commission 
decision imposing very important fines before having had the opportunity to a "fair trial" 
complying with the requirements of Article 6 ECHR. This is illustrated by the Microsoft case 
where Microsoft was forced to divulge under the threat of daily penalty fines valuable know-
how before any court had ever heard its case.162  This practice has also been condemned by 
the ECtHR in criminal cases.163
A second issue is the obligation which is put on national courts not to contradict a 
Commission decision when they are dealing with a case based on the same facts than those 
being dealt with by the Commission.
 
 
164
III. Conclusions – The way forward 
 Thus, companies could not only be subject to the fines 
of the Commission, but also possibly to injunctive relief or damage actions in several Member 
Sates with authoritative reference to the Commission’s decision, before having been offered 
the chance of being heard in accordance with the requirements of a fair trial embodied in 
Article 6 ECHR. Under the current case-law, national courts have no obligation to refer 
questions of validity of Community decisions to the ECJ if they find that there is no reason to 
consider such acts illegal, nor are they under any obligation to stay proceedings until a 
judgment is given by the Community courts. 
 
 
There is a growing tendency towards building a more efficient economic justice and a high 
level of enforcement of antitrust rules by public authorities. This cannot be done however at 
the cost of disregard for fundamental rights. The intention of some Member States to formally 
"decriminalise" competition law is unacceptable at a time where the level of the fines and 
other remedies which are imposed on companies have never been as high.  
 
                                                        
160 Article 242 EC. See also K. LENAERTS, I. MASELIS and D. ARTS, cited above, at p. 419, and W. WILS, 
“The Combination (…)”, cited above, at p. 202. 
161 The grant of interim relief is subject to three cumulative conditions, namely (i) that there is a prima 
facie case for the adoption of the requested measures both in fact and in law, (ii) that their adoption is 
necessary to avoid serious and irreparable damage, and (iii) that the balance of interests favours such 
an order. The condition of "serious and irreparable damage" is generally interpreted extremely narrowly 
as meaning that any financial loss will only constitute such an "irreparable damage" if, for example, the 
very existence of the undertaking would be threatened. (See notably the Order of the President of the 
Court of 21 March 1997 in case T-41/97 R, Antillean Rice Mills v. Council [1997] ECR p. II-447, at para. 
47) 
162 See D. Waelbroeck "Microsoft Round 12 – Is the Commission now trying to preempt the judges?", 
Competition Law Insights 2007.  
163 Judgment of 27 January 2004, Kyprianou, cited above, at para. 45. Again, such an absence of 
suspensory effect would be acceptable in administrative or civil case but not in criminal cases in the light 
of the Convention. 
164 Judgment of the Court of 14 December 2000 in Case C-344/98, Masterfoods [2000] ECR p. I-11369, 
at paras. 49-60. See also Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v. Commission [2003] ECR p. II-4653, at 
para. 199. On the precise implications of this jurisprudence, see A. P. KOMNINOS, “Effect of Commission 
decisions on private antitrust litigation: setting the story straight”, 44 CMLR (2007), pp. 1387-1428. 
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The case-law of the ECHR makes very clear that –except for "minor offences" sanctions must 
be imposed at first instance by an independent and impartial tribunal fulfilling all the 
requirements of Article 6 ECHR. Subsequent judicial review is not sufficient in that regard.  
 
The day has therefore come to start thinking about a profound reform of the current system, 
both to comply with the ECHR and to make it more efficient and legitimate. Ideally, this should 
be done by granting the decisional power to the CFI, or to a new competition court.  
 
In this regard, the view has sometimes been expressed that such a reform would require a 
modification in the treaties themselves, under which it is allegedly the Commission which is 
responsible for developing competition policy and ensuring compliance with the competition 
rules, not the ECJ, whose role is only to ensure that “in the interpretation and application of 
this Treaty the law is observed”.165 In the Italian Flat Glass case, the Court thus considered 
that “although a Community court may, as part of the judicial review of the acts of the 
Community administration, partially annul a Commission decision in the field of competition, 
that does not mean that it has jurisdiction to remake the contested decision. The assumption 
of such jurisdiction could disturb the inter-institutional balance established by the Treaty and 
would risk prejudicing the rights of defence. In the light of those factors, the Court considers 
that it is not for itself, in the circumstances of the present case, to carry out a comprehensive 
re-assessment of the evidence before it, nor to draw conclusions from that evidence in the 
light of the rules on competition.”166
However, in our opinion, this case-law cannot be read as preventing a change in the 
decisional Structure defined in Regulation n° 1/2003 but only as defining the scope of judicial 
review when the adjucative function is vested with the Commission. Thus, when the 
Commission has decision-making power –as it currently has in Regulation n° 1/2003, the 
Treaty does not allow full jurisdictional review (except for fines). This does however not mean 
that the Treaty prohibits a system whereunder antitrust decisions are taken by the Courts and 
not by the Commission if Regulation n° 1/2003 is modified accordingly. In this regard, EC 
Article 83 indeed gives to the Council the legislative power, on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament to adopt "the appropriate 
regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 81 and 82" and in 
particular "to define the respective functions of the Commission and of the Court of Justice" in 
applying the competition rules. This leaves thus every possibility open to leave the 
adjudicating function in antitrust cases to the Courts and in this regard, ideally the role of the 
Court could be taken over by an EU competition court created as a "judicial panel" attached to 
the CFI, according to Article 225a of the EC Treaty.
 
 
167
                                                        
165 Article 220 EC. See A. ANDREANGELI, cited above. 
166 Joined cases T-68, 77-78/89, Società Italiana Vetro SpA and others v. Commission, [1992] ECR II-
1403, at para. 319. 
167 See also OECD Report quoted above, p. 64. 
 
 
It can be recalled here that in areas other than competition, the Court has been entrusted with 
the power to find infringements (see e.g. ECA p. 226) and there is no reason why the same 
should not be true in antitrust cases. 
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